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The World of Fifty (Interoperable) Facebooks 
Przemysław Pałka* 
This Article envisions a “world of fifty facebooks,” where numerous 
companies would offer interoperable services, similar to the one currently 
provided by Facebook Inc.  As is the case with telephones, where customers 
of AT&T can call and text those of T-Mobile or Verizon, users of A-Book 
should be able to find, communicate with, and see the content of customers 
of B-Book, C-Book, etc.  Facebook Inc. should be required to allow potential 
competitors to become interoperable with its platform and to grant them 
access to its network.  Today, Facebook Inc. uses its artificially created 
monopolistic position to impose excessive costs and unnecessary harms on 
consumers and society. 
This Article presents a new theory of the “price” that Facebook Inc. 
charges for its services, going beyond the conventional wisdom that users 
pay for access with their “personal data and attention.”  It argues that 
Facebook Inc. imposes on its users: (i) cognitive harms (emotional 
manipulation, risk of psychological and mental health problems); (ii) 
behavioral harms (unwanted purchases, wasted time, risk of addiction); 
and (iii) privacy/security harms (risk of having amassed personal data 
stolen by hackers).  The company also (iv) freerides on users’ creative 
content and labor.  Each of these harms constitutes a higher “price” or 
lower quality than could be available in a competitive market.  
Importantly, these costs do not result from the necessary features of “a 
facebook” but rather from Facebook Inc.’s data-collection-heavy, 
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targeted-advertising-driven business model.  Less harmful models, 
however, are available. 
The Article surveys possible legal strategies for achieving and 
sustaining “the world of fifty facebooks.”  As the debates about regulation 
of large platforms continue in the US and the EU, this Article serves as a 
reminder that, as a society, we face a choice.  We might accept the central 
role that platforms like Facebook Inc. currently play in our socioeconomic 
lives and focus solely on taming the most abusive behaviors they engage 
in.  Alternatively, we might embrace the fact that there is nothing natural 
nor necessary about this position and concentrate on restructuring the 
online power relationships.  Doing so requires imagination and political 
will, and this Article aims at fostering both.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a world where the telephone was invented ten years ago 
and ever since has been offered by one company only, Telephone Inc.  
Imagine that Telephone Inc. insists that it is technologically impossible 
for other providers to be interoperable with its product.  If you use 
Telephone Inc., you can only call and receive calls from other Telephone 
Inc. customers.  Even when Smartphone Inc. creates a similar and 
complementary service, you cannot use it to call people who are 
Telephone Inc. customers.  As a result, even though other companies 
would like to enter the market and compete by offering lower prices and 
higher quality, network effects prevent them from doing so.  Everyone 
is already “on Telephone.”  Subsequently, the monopolist can impose 
contract conditions that consumers would not have otherwise accepted, 
such as listening to all of your phone calls and inserting ads in the middle 
of conversations.  
You might think this thought experiment is strange; phones of 
various providers can obviously be interoperable with one another.  But 
ask yourself, would this be evident to an inhabitant of a world where the 
telephone has always been provided by just one company?  Inhabitants 
of that world still need to realize this otherwise simple fact. 
We are the inhabitants of that world, though it is Facebook Inc., not 
Telephone Inc., that we falsely believe to be a “natural” monopolist. 
Facebook Inc. is currently the monopolist in the market for 
facebooks, the new universal way to communicate and coordinate social 
life.1  It excludes competitors from offering consumers similar services 
by artificially creating access barriers to the network of the platform’s 
users.2  Given the network effects—”everyone” already “being on 
 
 1 Throughout the Article, the word “Facebook” is used in three different ways: (1) 
“Facebook Inc.” refers to the company; (2) “Facebook” refers to the platform (the 
product) offered by Facebook Inc.; (3) and “a facebook” refers to the kind of 
communication tool that Facebook is an example of. 
 2 Moreover, Facebook Inc. has proactively engaged in various strategies aimed at 
removing emerging competitors in their nascent forms in order to preserve its 
dominance.  See TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 119–26 
(2018).  According to Jon Sarlin, Facebook Inc. uses a three-prong strategy of “buy, deny 
and apply,” where it either purchases early-stage potential competitions, including 
Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014; denies competitors access to its data or APIs 
(as was the case with Vine); or copies functionalities developed by other companies (as 
was the case with Snapchat, and now with Facebook Dating).  The “deny” strategy 
especially exemplifies how Facebook Inc. purposely limits its technical interoperability 
to limit competition.  See Jon Sarlin, This is How Facebook Kills its Competition, CNN 
BUSINESS (Mar. 21, 2019) https://www.cnn.com/videos/business/2019/03/21/this-is-
how-facebook-kills-its-competition.cnn-business/video/playlists/business-facebook.  
These activities are at the core of the most recent lawsuit that the Federal Trade 
Commission [hereinafter “the FTC”] has filed against Facebook Inc., together with 48 
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Facebook”—potential competitors cannot fairly compete on quality and 
price.3  
There is nothing “natural” or “necessary,” however, about 
Facebook Inc.’s monopoly over the network of people using the service 
of “a facebook.”4  Facebook is not like railways, or bridges, or the electric 
grid.5  Technologically speaking, just like with the telephone, facebooks 
provided by different companies could be interoperable with one 
another.6  It is a question of how we want to structure the world we live 
in; a question of imagination and political will.  You could be using A-
Book, I could be using B-Book, and our friend could be using C-Book, and 
still, we should be able to add each other as friends, communicate and 
coordinate social life through the same medium offered by different 
providers.  We would all have access to the same “online space,” just 
provided by many companies, offering varying business conditions.  
This world is technologically possible.  Why is it normatively desirable? 
 
Attorneys General.  See Cecilia Kang & Mike Isaac, U.S. and States Say Facebook Illegally 
Crushed Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/
technology/facebook-antitrust-monopoly.html; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC 
Sues Facebook for Illegal Monopolization (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2020/12/ftc-sues-facebook-illegal-monopolization [hereinafter 
“the FTC’s Facebook lawsuit press release”]. 
 3 See Thomas E. Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers, 99 TEXAS L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 34), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3665040 
(arguing that “[d]ue to the network effects that underlie many platforms’ success, people 
are loath to experiment with new players unless enough of their friends do too.  
Interoperability is one way to counteract these high switching costs, and protecting 
adversarial interoperability ensures that the existing platforms don’t retain a veto 
power over innovation that threatens their market dominance”). 
 4 For an argument that Facebook is a “natural monopoly,” see, e.g., Dipayan Ghosh, 
Don’t Break Up Facebook—Treat It Like a Utility, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 30, 2019), 
https://hbr.org/2019/05/dont-break-up-facebook-treat-it-like-a-utility (“I contend 
that Facebook and firms like it have become natural monopolies that necessitate a novel, 
stringent set of regulations to obstruct their capitalistic overreaches and protect the 
public against ingrained economic exploitation.”). 
 5 Even if, for the adjudication purposes, it might sometimes be useful to act as if it 
was similar to railroads or other infrastructure.  For an example of such a case, see 
Nikolas Guggenberger, Essential Platforms, 24 STAN. TECH. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3703361 
(arguing that the doctrine of essential facilities should be applied to temper platforms’ 
dominant position, as “[w]hat the railroads were to the early twentieth century, digital 
platforms have become to the early twenty-first century”).  Guggenberger is correct as 
a matter of description, but unlike railroads for trains, platforms do not have to be all-
encompassing vehicles for online interaction.  
 6 See infra Section IV.A.  For an explanation of how opening the APIs could lead to 
much higher interoperability between the online platforms, see Katarzyna 
Szymielewicz, A New Deal for Data, STARTUP (Nov. 14, 2019), https://medium.com/swlh/
a-new-deal-for-data-1c6d7c850e25. 
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As a monopolist, Facebook Inc. can impose various costs on 
consumers, costs that consumers would refuse to accept in a 
competitive market.  Those go beyond the conventional wisdom 
according to which “users pay for Facebook with data and attention”7 
and include (i) cognitive harms,8 (ii) behavioral harms,9 (iii) 
privacy/security harms,10 and (iv) freeriding on users’ creative content 
and labor.11  One might treat these costs as a higher “price” that users 
pay or lower quality of the service that consumers receive.12  But there 
is no necessary connection between these costs and the features of the 
service Facebook Inc. provides to consumers.   
On the contrary, these costs are a consequence of a toxic business 
model—based on never-ending data collection and targeted 
advertising—which Facebook Inc. can rely on, given its monopolistic 
position.13  This business model incentivizes Facebook Inc. to “addict” 
users to the platform and have them engage as much as possible, even if 
this means that more “negative” content is shown to them.14  Other 
business models are possible, however, including subscription fees, or 
revenue from non-data-collection-driven advertising, or a model where 
 
 7 See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 4 (“The currency extracted from individuals in the 
consumer internet context is typically not money, but a novel, complex combination of 
the individual’s personal data and attention.”).  
 8 See infra Section III.B.1; see also JARON LANIER, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR DELETING YOUR 
SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS RIGHT NOW 81–92 (2018); Przemysław Pałka, Private Law and 
Cognitive Science, in LAW AND MIND (Bartosz Brozek & Jaap Hage eds., forthcoming 2021). 
 9 See infra Section III.B.2; see also JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE 
LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 83–98 (2019); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE 
OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 
74–96 (2019); Ido Kilovaty, Legally Cognizable Manipulation, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449, 
461–73 (2019). 
 10 See infra Section III.B.3.  See generally Ido Kilovaty, Privatized Cybersecurity Law, 
11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).  
 11 See infra Section III.B.4; see also ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS 
205–23 (2018).  
 12 For a general overview of harmful effects of the online platforms operating based 
on their current business models, see James Niels Rosenquist & Fiona M. Scott Morton, 
The Disutility of Exploitative Technology: Implications for Regulation and Antitrust 
(Working Paper presented at the “Big Tech and Antitrust Conference” at Yale Law School 
in New Haven CT, on Oct. 3–4, 2020; manuscript with the author); see also STIGLER CTR. 
COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF DIG. PLATFORMS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE 
REPORT 23–138 (2019), https://www.chicagobooth.edu/research/stigler/news-and-
media/committee-on-digital-platforms-final-report [hereinafter “THE STIGLER REPORT”]. 
 13 See infra Section III.A. 
 14 See JACK BALKIN, FIXING SOCIAL MEDIA’S GRAND BARGAIN 4 (2018), 
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf 
(“The more digital companies know about people’s emotional vulnerabilities and 
predispositions, the more easily they can structure individual end-user experience to 
addict end users to the site.”); LANIER, supra note 8; Rosenquist & Scott Morton, supra 
note 12. 
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users are compensated for their creativity and labor.15  The price of 
using “a facebook” could be much lower.16 
Hence, I argue that Facebook Inc. should be required to give 
potential competitors access to its platform and network, allowing other 
companies to offer similar and complementary services which are 
interoperable with the Facebook service and network.  I envision a 
“world of fifty facebooks,” with many businesses competing on price, 
quality, and innovation.  These companies could offer people novel 
contractual conditions, better corresponding to what consumers 
actually prefer.  For example, A-Book could offer no data collection and 
no ads, but a subscription fee.  B-Book could offer could offer an ad-
based model with less data collection and with fact-checking as a part of 
the service.  C-Book could compensate its users for their time, labor, and 
content, etc.  Moreover, complementary services (add-ons) could 
emerge in addition to these full-fledged substitutes, ranging from 
companies curating and moderating content to enhancing the 
experience in any other way.  Such competition would allow consumers 
to better express their preferences, minimize the consumer surplus 
extraction by the monopolist, and lead to higher consumer benefits and 
more efficient allocation of social resources.  But it will only become 
possible once the network of facebooks users is not intrinsically linked 
to one service, as it is today. 
Competition in the market for facebooks is necessary, but not 
sufficient, to tackle all the harms and costs of informational capitalism.17  
The newly created market will need to be regulated, both to ensure the 
interoperability of the services (technical standards)18 and to minimize 
 
 15 See infra Section III.A.  For arguments supporting compensation not just for 
content and labor but for all the harms stemming from using social media (claiming that 
the surplus is much lower than we tend to assume) see generally Hunt Allcott, Luca 
Braghieri, Sarah Eichmeyer & Matthew Gentzkow, The Welfare Effects of Social Media, 
110 AM. ECON. REV. 629 (2019). 
 16 “Price” both as in “the price for a cup of coffee is $3” and “a knee injury is the price 
you pay for jogging in the wrong shoes.” 
 17 For the definition of the term, see COHEN, supra note 9, at 5–6 (“[T]he alignment of 
capitalism as a mode of production with informationalism as a mode of development.  
Capitalism ‘is oriented toward profit-maximizing, that is, toward increasing the amount 
of surplus appropriated by capital on the basis of the private control over the means of 
production and circulation,’ while informationalism ‘is oriented . . . toward the 
accumulation of knowledge and towards higher levels of complexity in information 
processing.’  In a regime of informational capitalism, market actors use knowledge, 
culture, and networked information technologies as means of extracting and 
appropriating surplus value, including consumer surplus.”). 
 18 As is the case with telephones.  See Ian Walden, Access and Interconnection, in 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND REGULATION (Ian Walden ed. 2018); see also infra Section 
IV.B. 
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some externalities, such as certain types of discrimination19 and 
manipulation.20  Nevertheless, the regulation of service providers’ 
conduct is one of the possible modes of governance; we should not 
discount other options, including market forces.21  And, for these forces 
to operate, competition is necessary.  As of today, Facebook Inc. has 
none.  It is up to us, as a society, to decide whether we want to accept 
the central role of the large platforms and only regulate them at the 
margins, or whether we will challenge their position.  At least regarding 
Facebook Inc., I argue we should do the latter.  
There are many ways to transition from the world we live in now 
to the “world of fifty facebooks.”  They include, among others, enacting 
new regulation and enforcing existing antitrust laws.  It is not my 
ambition in this Article to outline these strategies in detail.  I do not 
engage with questions of how a particular policy reform should be 
conducted (institutionally, or what should be the exact content of rules), 
or how the antitrust case should be argued.  Each of these questions 
would need a paper of its own.  I look at the problem from the bird’s-eye 
policy perspective and from a conceptual standpoint.  This means that 
for a reader deeply immersed in technical debates in 
telecommunications law,22 utilities regulation,23 or antitrust law,24 my 
usage of terms like “monopolist,” “product market” or 
“interoperability”25 might seem rather general.  This is because, rather 
than arguing for a particular interpretation of existing laws, or a specific 
phrasing of the provisions to be enacted, I want to make a normative 
 
 19 For a discussion of race- and gender-based discrimination in data-driven ad 
delivery, see Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 1301 ARXIV 
6822 (2013), https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.6822; see also Muhammad Ali et al., 
Discrimination through Optimization: How Facebook’s Ad Delivery Can Lead to Skewed 
Outcomes, 1904 ARXIV 02095 (2019), https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.02095. 
 20 See Eliza Mik, The Erosion of Autonomy in Online Consumer Transactions, 8 L. 
INNOVATION & TECH. 1, 1–2 (2016).  See generally Kilovaty, supra note 9. 
 21 For the canonical discussion the interrelationship between law and regulation, 
design and markets see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 
(1999). 
 22 See Walden, supra note 18. 
 23 For an analysis of Facebook’s (and other tech companies) behavior from the 
perspective of utilities regulation, see generally K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: 
Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 
39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621 (2018).  
 24 For an example of how an antitrust case against Facebook could be argued in the 
United States, see Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s 
Journey Towards Pervasive Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for Privacy, 
16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 39 (2019).  For an argument for changing the way we understand 
the logic of antitrust law in the technology sphere, though on the case study of Amazon, 
not Facebook, see Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017). 
 25 See infra Section IV.A. 
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claim regarding the aims that the law should pursue.  I sketch the goal 
and justify it.  My ambition is to imagine the world of fifty facebooks, 
convince the reader we should aim at it, and sketch the possible 
pathways without providing an itinerary.  
At the time of this writing, two important developments have just 
occurred.  First, on December 9, 2020, the FTC, together with the 
Attorneys General of forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and Guam, 
filed a lawsuit against Facebook Inc.26  The lawsuit petitions “for a 
permanent injunction and other equitable relief against Defendant 
Facebook, Inc., . . . to undo and prevent its anticompetitive conduct and 
unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce in violation of 
Section 5 [of the FTC Act].”27  In particular, the FTC seeks to break up 
Facebook horizontally (“divestiture of assets, divestiture or 
reconstruction of businesses (including, but not limited to, Instagram 
and/or WhatsApp”)).28  Moreover, it intends to significantly limit future 
mergers and acquisitions,29 as well as to halt anticompetitive behavior 
in vertical relations.30  
It is hard to overstate the importance of this lawsuit.  Of course, it 
will take time, and without a doubt, Facebook Inc. will fight back hard.  
But the process is already in motion.  Importantly, even though the FTC 
did not ask the court to require Facebook Inc.’s horizontal 
interoperability (though, arguably, it does seek to increase vertical 
interoperability), we should remember that the case can come to an end 
in various ways.  It might end up with a judgment, but it might just as 
well (and probably will) be resolved through a settlement.  There, the 
parties can agree to anything, including horizontal interoperability.  I 
hope that this Article serves as a source for inspiration for why the FTC 
should pursue this goal and provide additional ammunition for those 
seeking to explain why exactly Facebook Inc.’s artificial monopolization 
of access to the network of users comes with a significant cost to society 
and consumers.  Hopefully, a similar suit will follow across the Atlantic, 
in the European Union.  In the end, Facebook Inc.’s conduct is in breach 
 
 26 See Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590 (D.D.C. 
Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/051_2021.01.21_
revised_partially_redacted_complaint.pdf [hereinafter “The FTC’s Facebook Lawsuit”] 
(Public redacted version of document filed under seal); see also Cecilia Kang & Mike 
Isaac, U.S. and States Say Facebook Illegally Crushed Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/technology/facebook-antitrust-
monopoly.html.  
 27 The FTC’s Facebook Lawsuit, supra note 26 at 1. 
 28 Id. at 51. 
 29 Id.  
 30 Id. at 52 (noting “that Facebook is permanently enjoined from imposing 
anticompetitive conditions on access to APIs and data”). 
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of a fundamental principle of the liberal democratic political economy, 
i.e., opposition to the unchecked private power of a monopolist.31  This 
principle, on the small “c” constitutional level, is very similar both in the 
US and the EU, even if the details of the laws concretizing this principle 
are different in both jurisdictions.32  
Second, on December 15, 2020, the European Commission released 
drafts of the long-awaited Digital Services Act (DSA)33 and Digital 
Market Act (DMA).34  The former instrument seeks to “set out uniform 
rules for a safe, predictable and trusted online environment, where 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are effectively protected,”35 
whereas the latter lays down “rules ensuring contestable and fair 
markets in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers are 
present.”36  Given that these laws, when enacted, will apply to the 
American-based companies directing their services at European Union 
residents, one should keep them in mind when seeking ways to create 
the world of fifty facebooks.  The current versions hint at 
interoperability several times, especially regarding ad-repositories,37 
various information sharing systems,38 and non-discrimination in 
access to the APIs.39  This is, by far, not enough; however, the legislative 
process has just begun, and the text can still be changed.  The enactment 
of the General Data Protection Regulation40 in 2016, which, despite 
 
 31 See WU, supra note 2, at 76–77. 
 32 But, despite some significant differences between the particular solutions and the 
currently predominant normative theories in both jurisdictions, the internal logic of the 
antitrust laws in the US and the EU are quite similar.  See Guggenberger, supra note 5, at 
47 (arguing that, at least genealogically, the European and the American antitrust law 
are much closer aligned that one would nowadays assume).  For a comprehensive 
comparison of these two systems, see RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, ECONOMICS AND THE 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S. AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAWS (2014). 
 33 See European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and 
amending Directive 2000/31/EC, Brussels, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM(2020) 825), 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0825&
from=en [hereinafter “the DSA”]. 
 34 See European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets 
Act), EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM (2020) 842), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0842&from=en [hereinafter “the DMA”]. 
 35 See the DSA, supra note 33, art. 1.2.b. 
 36 See the DMA, supra note 34, art. 1.1. 
 37 See the DSA, supra note 33, art. 34.1.e. 
 38 Id. art. 67. 
 39 Id. art. 6.1.c, 6.1.f. 
 40 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
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being heavily lobbied, ended up establishing quite consumer-friendly 
obligations on companies, is one reason to believe that the Europeans 
will succeed in laying down strict rules governing companies like 
Facebook Inc.  But—and this is of utmost importance—it is not enough 
to “tame” large online platforms’ behavior.  The very structure of online 
power can be decentralized and democratized, and I hope that this 
Article will serve as an encouragement to do so for the European 
legislators. 
This Article consists of three parts.  Part II explains exactly what 
service Facebook Inc provides from the consumers’ point of view and 
why it constitutes its own product market, where the platform and the 
network are intrinsically connected.  It also imagines what a competitive 
market in facebooks could look like.  Part III demonstrates why the 
current business model of Facebook Inc. is not necessary, surveys the 
types of harms it imposes on consumers, and demonstrates how those 
harms could be avoided in a competitive market.  Part IV sketches some 
ideas about the legal strategy for transitioning from the status quo to the 
“world of fifty facebooks,” including a more general analysis of the 
concept of interoperability, the role of regulation as both a facilitator of 
competition, and as a way to combat certain abusive practices across the 
board.  
II.  WHAT IS “A FACEBOOK”? 
In this Part, I argue that “a facebook” is a new, universal tool for 
social communication, intrinsically connected to the network of people 
using it.  Facebook Inc. created this tool and is currently the monopolist 
in the market for facebooks.  I explain why, instead of thinking about 
Facebook Inc. as competing in the market for “social media,” we should 
treat its service and network as a separate type of product.  I analyze 
what the characteristics of this product are.  Finally, I provide a first 
sketch of the world where several companies, fully interoperable with 
one another, could be offering the same type of service, or some 
complementary add-ons to it. 
  
 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPR]. 
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A.  A Multifunctional Tool and the Network of Users 
From the consumers’ (users’) perspective,41 a facebook is 
essentially seven things, analytically capable of being studied 
separately, but phenomenologically necessarily interrelated: 
1. A Search Engine for People/Uniform Identifier System, 
where one can “find” a person using the search 
function and “friend” or “follow” them.  In this sense, a 
facebook is a “phonebook,” all-encompassing and 
perpetually up to date; 
2. A Direct Messaging System, where the messenger tool 
allows people to call or send messages to each other; 
3. A Coordination Tool, where users can coordinate 
logistics of common projects and social life, through 
functionalities like Events, Groups, or Marketplace; 
4. A Blogging/Vlogging Service, where each user’s 
Timeline is their own personal site, supported by an 
interface allowing the user to upload content and 
enabling others to engage with it by “reacting” with 
emojis, commenting, or sharing—a tool for content 
production; 
5. A Content Aggregator, where each user sees a 
personalized Newsfeed and does not have to “visit” 
blogs she is interested in individually but can simply 
rely on the provider’s algorithm to display the most 
“relevant” content—a tool for convenient content 
consumption; 
6. A Tool for Accessing the Network of People 
simultaneously using the same service; 
7. An ID system, allowing users to “log into” other 
services using their Facebook account. 
These seven functionalities, taken together, characterize the 
product offered by Facebook Inc. in the year 2021 and, subsequently, 
the product market in which Facebook Inc. operates.  Other “social 
media companies”—like Twitter, LinkedIn, TikTok, etc.—offer different 
types of products.  These products cannot be substitutes, both because 
they lack certain functionalities that render a facebook the universal 
 
 41 For purposes of this Article’s argument, I am not looking at the services that 
Facebook provides for advertisers and its role in the ads market.  The reason is that, as 
I show, ads are not a conceptually necessary part of the Facebook environment; the 
company’s business model could be different when monetization of the consumer 
product is concerned, and it is the consumer product that I want to focus on.  For analysis 
of Facebook’s role in the ads market, from the competition policy perspective, see  
BRITISH COMPETITION AND MKTS. AUTH., ONLINE PLATFORMS AND DIGITAL ADVERTISING: MARKET 
STUDY INTERIM REPORT (2020), https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-platforms-and-
digital-advertising-market-study. 
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tool of communication and because their networks are not 
interoperable.  
What makes Facebook so appealing to users, such that despite 
numerous scandals concerning privacy,42 experimenting on users 
without their consent,43 alleged negative consequences for mental 
health,44 and a dubious role in the political process,45 Facebook’s user 
base is growing,46 generating more and more profits for the company?47  
This, in one sense, is an empirical question, requiring rigorous 
qualitative and quantitative studies, which I would be more than happy 
to see conducted.  It is also a conceptual question, however, and below I 
offer a theory explaining what makes Facebook not only a product 
market of its own but also such a desirable product that people are 
willing to pay a much higher price for it than necessary.  
1.  A “Phonebook” and the Network Effects 
Let us start with the first functionality listed above, the one that 
gave Facebook its name—a facebook, a search engine for people and a 
tool for staying connected.  Many American colleges and professional 
schools print such booklets for their students, faculty, and staff, 
facilitating intra-institutional communication.  After a couple of years, 
however, these booklets are no longer useful for communication (they 
might be useful for archival purposes, or as souvenirs).  But what if these 
booklets somehow updated themselves all the time?  You pull out a 
catalog of your classmates from ten years ago, see their current pictures, 




 42 For an overview of privacy scandals that Facebook has been involved in, see James 
Sanders & Dan Patterson, Facebook Data Privacy Scandal: A Cheat Sheet, TECHREPUBLIC 
(July 24, 2019), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/facebook-data-privacy-
scandal-a-cheat-sheet.  
 43 See Kashmir Hill, Facebook Manipulated 689,003 Users’ Emotions for Science, 
FORBES (June 28, 2014, 2:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/06/
28/facebook-manipulated-689003-users-emotions-for-science; see also Kilovaty, supra 
note 9, at 473. 
 44 See Ravi Chandra, Is Facebook Destroying Society and Your Mental Health?, PSYCH. 
TODAY (Jan. 29, 2018) https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-pacific-heart/
201801/is-facebook-destroying-society-and-your-mental-health. 
 45 See Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the 
Fallout So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/
politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html.  
 46 See infra Section III.A. 
 47 See infra Section III.A. 
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Try to imagine all the people that you know, whom you have met 
at some point: your friends and teachers from high school, former 
colleagues, distant relatives, people you met at a conference, etc.  That 
is a large group.  You do not have most of their phone numbers or email 
addresses.  There is a significant group of people that you “know,” you 
“met,” but whom you cannot reach.  
Facebook solves this problem.  Especially for the generations that 
en masse signed up for it—definitely the millennial generation (82% of 
American millennials are Facebook users)48—but also for 30% of the 
entire Earth’s population,49 there is a very high chance that people can 
stay in touch using the platform.  If you add someone as a friend in 
college, they will “remain your friend” a decade later.  If you meet 
someone at a party, an easy way to stay in touch is to become friends on 
Facebook.  You can do it on your computer or using your smartphone.  It 
is convenient, fast, and reliable.  Additionally, even if you did not add 
someone as a friend on Facebook at the time when you met, you can still 
find them there later.  The “search” function, combined with the 
company’s policy requiring people to use their real names50 and the 
functionality displaying “common friends” with other people, is a 
powerful tool for “rediscovering” and “reconnecting with” people you 
once met. 
In this sense, Facebook Inc.’s product is an ever-updated college 
facebook, or, even better, a universal phonebook.  A phonebook where, 
instead of phone numbers, you get to “friend” someone and message 
them on Facebook.  And where the absolute monopolist is Facebook Inc.  
For, to be able to rely on this “phonebook”—as there are no “phone 
numbers,” only the ability to connect within the specific service—you 
need to be a user of Facebook. 
 
 48 Out of 71 million millennials in the United States, 58.3 million are Facebook users.  
This amounts to 82 percent.  See J. Clement, Number of Facebook Users By Age in the U.S. 
2018, STATISTA (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/398136/us-
facebook-user-age-groups; Millennials, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Millennials (last visited Dec. 31, 2020). 
 49 Facebook reported its monthly user base reached 2.498 billion in 2019.  See 
Facebook Investor Relations, Facebook Quarterly Earnings Slides, at 3, 
https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2019/q4/Q4-2019-Earnings-
Presentation-_final.pdf [hereinafter “Facebook 2019 report”].  At the time of this 
Article’s writing, Earths population equals 7.83 billion, see World Population, 
WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population (last visited Dec. 31, 
2020).  Both numbers are growing.  
 50 See Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last 
visited Dec. 31, 2020) (“When people stand behind their opinions and actions, our 
community is safer and more accountable.  For this reason, you must . . . [u]se the same 
name that you use in everyday life.”) [hereinafter “Facebook Terms”]. 
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2.  Messaging and Social Coordination 
Facebook is not just a “phonebook,” it is also a tool for 
communication and social coordination.  You can text, send files or 
images, call, or video call all your “friends.”  It is a modern phone.  Of 
course, other tools allow you to do the same—email, texting, or Skype.  
But to communicate with people using those tools, you need to know 
their number, email address, or Skype ID.  A facebook is both a way to 
find someone and to contact them.  Besides, there are tools other than 
direct messaging and calls, making communication and coordination 
even more accessible. 
Facebook also allows you to create “events” and invite people to 
your public lecture, a birthday party, or a movie marathon.  These events 
can be private or public.  You can use them to coordinate with your close 
friends, with people you somehow know, and even to promote open to 
the public activities you organize.  
Then, there are “groups:” a group for legal scholars, for local 
volunteers, for your sports team, for philosophy fans, etc.  The groups 
are the next incarnation of “online forums.”  To give an anecdotal 
example, one of my younger cousins, currently in middle school, created 
a Facebook account because the entirety of the communication among 
her peers, from social life to homework self-help, was being coordinated 
via a Facebook group.  As anecdotal as this example might be, it indicates 
a wider trend—to be “included” becomes largely synonymous with 
having to use the services of Facebook Inc.  Some people might have the 
luxury to opt out; many others, however, have little choice other than to 
start a Facebook account.  
Finally, various other functionalities for coordination—like 
Facebook “marketplace” (competition to eBay), “dating” (competition to 
Tinder or Bumble), or “jobs” (competition to LinkedIn), and others 
(definitely in the pipeline)—make access to the network even more 
profitable as different kinds of coordination are enabled.  But, as of 
today, the only way to get access is to use the services of Facebook Inc.  
All this taken together—the ability to find people, to stay in touch, 
and to communicate with them through various types of tools dedicated 
to the particular needs of humans—makes Facebook so appealing.  And 
we have not even gotten to perhaps the most visible functionality of 
Facebook—that of content creation and consumption. 
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3.  Content Production and Consumption  
You learn a lot of information on Facebook, from the fact that your 
primary school friend got married and had a baby, to the fact that a new 
funny cat video is available, to social and political news.  Over half of 
Americans read their news on social media (here this category also 
includes other sites).51  Facebook is a way to consume content, from 
gossip, over entertainment, to information.  
At the same time, if you choose to, you can keep the world informed 
about what you are up to in the same way.  You got a new job—change 
your “about” section on Facebook.  Your relationship status changed—
indicate that on Facebook.52  You took a nice photo, read an interesting 
article, want to spread knowledge about a local initiative—share it on 
Facebook.  It is a tool for informing your peers about your life, thoughts, 
and ideas.  
Moreover, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, the ability to 
“go live” on Facebook—produce or consume streaming video—has 
become incredibly useful to many people and organizations.  Large 
swaths of our lives, including lectures and classes, religious services and 
prayers, motivational talks, and workouts, moved online, many of them 
to Facebook.  Of course, other providers—YouTube and Zoom among 
them—made going live possible.  If you are organizing an online lecture, 
however, Facebook presents many advantages, not least the fact that 
you can invite literally every one of your Facebook friends, which could 
be close to everyone you know.  If your class, church, or club already 
communicates via a Facebook group, this will be a natural platform to 
do streaming.  
Finally, Facebook enables users to be creative and produce content, 
as well as to be passive or active content consumers.  If your friend 
shares something you find outrageous, you can indicate that with an 
“angry” emoji or write a comment.  If you prefer, however, you can 
refrain from reacting, and just scroll further.  In this sense, Facebook is 
a TV and a newspaper, where everyone can be the producer, and 
everyone can re-print/re-broadcast (by linking or sharing) the content 
of others.  And it is up to you to choose who will see what.  Content may 
be public or private, but you always have the option to allow your 
 
 51 See Peter Suciu, More Americans Are Getting Their News From Social Media, FORBES 
(Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2019/10/11/more-
americans-are-getting-their-news-from-social-media. 
 52 This phenomenon is so widespread that numerous memes emerged, where the 
pun usually is the celebrant saying, “I now pronounce you husband and wife, you may 
now change your relationship status.”  Everything Funny, PINTEREST, 
https://www.pinterest.com/pin/25825397835850492/. 
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“friends” to see your content, just as they have the option to allow you 
to see theirs. 
4.  The Network and the ID System 
From a user’s perspective, what matters is that all these 
functionalities are available at the same time, within the same service, 
internally interoperable.  Each functionality is useful and worth 
something.  But the total utility a Facebook user derives from the 
platform is not just the sum of these utilities.  It is also the usefulness of 
being able to rely on various functionalities when communicating with 
various people interchangeably.  If you meet someone at a work 
conference and “friend” them on Facebook to stay in touch, akin to 
asking for their phone number, you also benefit from seeing the content 
they share, the comments they make on your posts, or the groups they 
might invite you to in the future.  
Other social media might serve some of the needs that Facebook 
does.  Twitter is a great platform to share and consume content, but not 
for finding your primary school friends.  It does not allow you to call 
your contacts, or to create events or groups.  LinkedIn might be a good 
professional tool for authenticating your CV, building a professional 
network, and helping you find some people you met, but it will not be a 
source of funny content or a way to organize a birthday party for your 
child.  Facebook is the new universal communication tool, allowing one 
to do all these things in one place. 
Moreover, Facebook accounts—given the company’s requirement 
to use one’s actual name—can often be used as a reliable way to identify 
people online.  For this reason, numerous other services—from Spotify 
to Tinder to a host of others—allow you to log in to their services using 
your Facebook account.  Once you do so, it is harder to quit.  Not 
impossible, but harder.  
In the context of all these considerations, we can begin to grasp the 
power of the network effects that benefit Facebook Inc.  Facebook Inc. is 
not just a neat product or a robust network of people but instead a 
robust network of people using a neat product at the same time.  
There is no technical reason, however, why this medium of 
communication, and access to the global network of people, needs to be 
provided by one operator only.53  Facebook can be interoperable with 
other platforms serving exactly the same needs, or providing subsidiary 
services—it is possible to open up the network to competitors’ access.54  
 
 53 See Szymielewicz, supra note 6.  
 54 Id.  
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The reason we do not live in this world is a business reason—Facebook 
Inc., unless forced by the law to open up to competition, has no interest 
in sharing its full dominance in the market for facebook(s) with other 
actors.  Hence, to change this state of affairs, the law needs to step in.  
Governing bodies must undertake new regulations, antitrust cases, or 
both, requiring the company to open up.  The success of these 
interventions, at least on the policy level, depends on demonstrating 
why Facebook Inc.’s monopoly position is harmful to consumers, why it 
potentially already constitutes an abuse of dominance, and why the law 
should intervene to remedy the situation in which we currently find 
ourselves. 
To offer an answer to these questions—i.e., survey what the costs 
of using Facebook currently are—let us take a brief look at the possible 
future I have in mind.  What could “the world of fifty (interoperable) 
facebooks” look like? 
B.  The World of Fifty Facebooks—A First Glance 
 In the world I envision, many corporations would compete in the 
facebooks market.  They would offer services consisting of the 
functionalities described above: allowing users to connect with other 
people; message them; coordinate conduct; and create, share, and 
consume content.  Most importantly, they would all allow the consumers 
to connect with the entire network of the facebooks’ users, just like 
people using different mobile phone providers can call and text one 
another.  They would share the common identification system for users, 
just like the telephone companies all “recognize” each other’s phone 
numbers, and would not discriminate against users of other platforms 
when access to their users is concerned. 
In this world, you could be a user of A-Book (showing no ads but 
charging a subscription fee), I could be a user of B-Book (showing ads, 
but based on my chosen preferences, not based on data collected 
without my understanding), and still, we would be able to find each 
other in the search bar, add each other as friends, send messages to each 
other, invite each other to events or groups, see each other’s content, 
and have our content seen by one another.  The user experience, though 
not necessary, could remain similar across platforms.  For example, we 
could still see the aggregated content in the newsfeed, events and 
groups in a side tab, and a search bar on top.  Or it could be different, 
whatever the innovators propose and consumers choose.  Maybe some 
users prefer a social media provider with no newsfeed, but something 
else.  The difference would be such that each of us will be able to choose 
the facebook provider whose services we want to receive, freely migrate 
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between providers, and benefit from the competition between the 
providers.  What matters is that consumers would be able to not only 
choose the functionalities they like but also the contract terms they 
prefer.  What alternative business models are possible?  
First, consider a subscription fee.  A new facebook provider could 
offer access to the platform and the network in exchange for monthly 
payments while refraining from collecting more data than necessary to 
provide the service, remaining ad-free, and giving users greater control 
over the newsfeed algorithm.  In the “tech sector,” we already pay to 
stream music and videos, for access to newspapers, etc.  Why wouldn’t 
some people choose to pay for the fundamental medium of 
communication, if that payment allowed them to avoid data collection 
and the behavioral and cognitive costs? 
 How much would it cost?  Of course, this would depend.  We can 
make some (very) rough estimates, however, based on publicly 
available data.  Facebook Inc.’s revenue for the fourth quarter of 2019 
in the US and Canada was $10.24 billion, out of which $10.02 billion (98 
percent) came from advertising,55 with 248 million monthly active 
users.56  Hence, on average, a user in the US and Canada generated 
revenue equal to $13.70 a month.  During the same period, the 
company’s global revenue was $21.08 billion, with 2,498 billion 
monthly active users.57  This amounts to a monthly average revenue of 
$2.84 per user worldwide.58  
For comparison, a monthly Netflix subscription in the US ranges 
between $8.99 and $17.99,59 while Spotify costs $9.99,60 and Amazon 
Prime $12.99.61  A $12 subscription fee for a facebook does not seem in 
any way excessive.  Especially if, in exchange, data collection ceases, and 
the risks of cognitive and behavioral harms decline. 
 
 55 See Facebook Investor Relations, Facebook Q4 2019 Results, at 9–10, 
https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2019/q4/Q4-2019-Earnings-
Presentation-_final.pdf.  
 56 Id. at 3. 
 57 Id. at 3–4, 8. 
 58 Id.  In this sense, Northern American users are unsurprisingly “subsidizing” users 
in less developed countries.  The types of harms suffered by these users are similar, 
however, and potentially more serious, given less accessible mental healthcare and/or 
less strict data (privacy) laws.  
 59 See Choose The Plan That’s Right For You, NETFLIX, https://www.netflix.com/
signup/planform (last visited Jan. 11, 2021). 
 60 See Pick Your Premium, SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/us/premium (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2021). 
 61 See Try Prime, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/amazonprime (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2021).  
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Further, unlike Netflix and Spotify, Facebook Inc. does not pay 
licenses to copyright holders and/or content producers.  Unlike Amazon 
Prime, it does not pay for the large logistical operation of two-day 
delivery.  Its costs are lower.  Of course, Facebook Inc. needs to finance 
its operations (data storage, software development, secure servers, 
etc.),  but at least a part of Facebook Inc.’s current business costs are the 
costs of the data-heavy, ad-based business model.  In a world of no ads 
and no data analytics, the cost of running the business would go down 
as well.  
Another possible business model could rely on less targeted 
advertising.  Instead of having data collected about them, users could be 
required to indicate a certain number of categories of products they are 
interested in or provide certain “static” types of information, like 
hobbies, age, type of job, etc.  The service provider could then display 
“generic” advertisements aimed at a particular kind of audience.  Such a 
model would not automatically remove some types of costs, like the risk 
of behavioral manipulation, but would decrease other costs, like the risk 
of addiction or a data breach.  Whether such a model would generate 
enough revenue to keep the service “free” is an empirical question that 
nobody can answer, precisely because of Facebook Inc.’s current 
dominance.  Nevertheless, in the world of fifty facebooks, this could be 
tested.  
Yet another option is to leave things roughly as they are but 
compensate users for their labor, content, and activity.  For the majority 
of users, this would not be a particularly significant payment, but for 
others hoping to attract the attention of millions, the payments could be 
significant.  Nevertheless, even the small amounts could constitute the 
consumer surplus; there is no reason why the monopolist should be in 
a position to keep all of it.  
Moreover, once companies operating facebooks are legally 
required to allow other companies access to their network and 
platforms, products serving as add-ons (complementary services) and 
not merely substitutes, could emerge.  For example, YourFeed Inc. could 
offer to curate content displayed on your facebook’s newsfeed.  A-Book 
could offer their own proprietary algorithm to determine what content 
you see but also enable other companies to perform that function for the 
user—and it would be up to the user to choose.  Or GroupHost Inc. could 
offer a service hosting interest groups (just like Facebook Groups now), 
recommend those that match your interests, or think of new ways to 
facilitate communication, and consumers would be able to find those 
groups in the search bar of the facebook they use.  Or HappyBday Inc. 
could offer various ways to send greetings to your friends celebrating 
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birthdays about which you learn from your facebook as well.  
Possibilities are infinite.  Of course, each of these services would need to 
make money somehow, through ads, charging a subscription fee, or in 
yet another way.  
Why would we want to do that, one may ask, if Facebook is free?  
Why bother with new regulations?  Can antitrust really be helpful here, 
since even if we accept Facebook Inc. has the dominant position in the 
facebook(s) market, it is hard to demonstrate any abuse if the price is 
zero?  The answer is Facebook is not free, the price is not zero, and 
Facebook Inc.’s conduct harms competition and consumers by 
providing lower quality than possible, charging higher prices than 
optimal, and stifling innovation. 
Let us see how. 
III.  THE COSTS OF USING FACEBOOK TODAY 
This Part analyzes why exactly using Facebook Inc.’s services is not 
“free.”  I go beyond the conventional wisdom that users pay for access 
with their “data and attention,”62 and outline exactly what economic and 
non-economic harms users incur.  These harms include (i) cognitive 
harms (emotional manipulation and risks for mental health), (ii) 
behavioral harms (unwanted purchases, wasted time, risk of addiction), 
(iii) privacy/security harms (risk of a data breach), and (iv) Facebook 
Inc.’s freeriding on users’ creative content and labor.  I demonstrate how 
many of these harms are contingent upon Facebook Inc.’s business 
model, and how many of these harms could be avoided in a world where 
users can actually choose the conditions of access and service.  Two 
caveats are due. 
First, I conceptualize the “harms” inflicted by Facebook Inc. as 
cost/price/quality to enable discussion internal to individualist, 
market-logic-oriented discussions in economic law.  This, I want to be 
clear, is not to disregard other normative theories of why what 
Facebook Inc. does is “bad.”  Many other accounts, principally opposed 
to the neoliberal market logic, are possible.  Such accounts would focus 
on the protection of “dignity” or “autonomy” of persons,63 or even refute 
the individualistic approaches to data harms altogether, focusing rather 
 
 62 See Ghosh, supra note 4. 
 63 This way of approaching the problem is typical for European law and technology 
scholars.  See, e.g., MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF LAW 
(2015); ROGER BROWNSWORD, RIGHTS, REGULATION AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 
(2008). 
PALKA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2021  10:51 AM 
2021] FIFTY (INTEROPERABLE) FACEBOOKS 1213 
on the relational and societal impacts.64  I welcome these accounts.  My 
aim, however, is to show that even within the market logic, the 
monopolistic behavior of Facebook Inc. needs to be evaluated 
negatively.  
Second, I firmly believe that not all “data-related” harms should be 
conceptualized as “privacy” harms.65  There is a tendency to treat all 
instances of data collection, analysis, sharing, and usage as “privacy” 
problems.  This tendency is understandable given that, historically, 
“privacy” has been the category employed to consider limiting who can 
do what with whose information, and this approach has clarified and 
enriched how we view some negative aspects of the data economy.66  
But treating all data-related harms as problems of “privacy” prevents us 
from seeing other harms stemming from data management.  In many 
ways, Facebook Inc. does respect and protect users’ privacy.  We have 
significant control over who can see what information we share, and we 
are not afraid that Mark Zuckerberg will call our friends and tell them 
embarrassing facts about us.  Facebook Inc. does not use data to 
“disclose” secrets of our lives.  It uses data to squeeze money out of us.  
And this begs for a different conceptual framework.  
A.  Data-Fueled, Ad- and Engagement-Driven Business Model 
One needs to distinguish the analysis of Facebook as a service, 
looking at what it does, and Facebook Inc.’s business model, looking at 
how the company makes money.  The two are not necessarily linked but 
the user experience is largely shaped by the latter.  To understand the 
costs to consumers and how they could be avoided, one must closely 
scrutinize incentives inherent to the current business model and 
consequences for the corporation’s behavior.  
Conventional wisdom is that Facebook Inc., albeit “free” in 
monetary terms, offers its service to consumers in exchange for their 
“data” and/or “attention.”67  This appears to be a two-party, mutual 
 
 64 See Salome Viljoen, Democratic Data: A Relational Theory for Data Governance 
(2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3727562. 
 65 See Przemysław Pałka, Data Management Law for the 2020s: The Lost Origins and 
the New Needs, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 559, 627–30 (2020). 
 66 Id.  For some marvelous takes on the social role of privacy and theories of privacy 
harms, see Lisa M. Austin, Privacy and Private Law: The Dilemma of Justification, 55 
MCGILL L.J. 165 (2010); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013); 
Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Privacy Harms, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (2018); 
Daniel J. Solove, I’ve Got Nothing to Hide and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 745 (2007). 
 67 See Ghosh, supra note 4. 
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transaction: Facebook Inc. provides an interactive facebook, while you 
provide your data and your attention.  This statement is misleading, 
even if partly true.  Indeed, Facebook Inc. collects information about its 
users, and, as we have heard many times by now, “data is the new oil.”68  
But Facebook Inc. cannot pay taxes on users’ data nor treat data as 
currency when paying employee salaries or shareholder dividends.  
Facebook Inc. needs money—real money. 
Mark Zuckerberg himself offered another take on Facebook Inc.’s 
business model in a now-famous exchange with Senator Orrin Hatch 
during the April 2018 Congressional hearings.69  When Hatch asked, 
“[H]ow do you sustain a business model in which users don’t pay for 
your service?” Zuckerberg answered, “Senator, we run ads.”70  
Zuckerberg’s answer, though it caused laughter in the chamber and 
sparked mockery online, was not entirely accurate.  Many outlets run 
ads, from radio to newspapers to TV channels, and yet none of these 
outlets have been accused of spying on customers,71 experimenting on 
them,72 or enabling Russia to meddle in the American election.73  Only a 
few of them are “free,” and none of them generate such high profits as 
Facebook Inc. does.  There must be something more.  
In reality, Facebook Inc.’s business model is to run data-driven, 
personalized, targeted advertisements in an environment designed to 
have users spend a significant amount of time engaging with content on 
the platform.74  The reason Facebook Inc. collects data about individual 
users is not only to learn about their preferences and simply “match” 
ads with these preferences but also to infer new knowledge about other 
users, constantly refine the effectiveness of its ad-delivery system, and 
ensure that users spend as much time as possible on the platform.75  
Facebook Inc.’s revenue increases with the number of advertisements it 
can display, which, in turn, is a function of how many users Facebook 
has, how much time they spend using the platform, and how effective 
advertisers believe the ads to be.  
 
 68 For the history of the slogan and its critique, see James Bridle, Opinion: Data Isn’t 
The New Oil—It’s The New Nuclear Power, TED (July 17, 2018), https://ideas.ted.com/
opinion-data-isnt-the-new-oil-its-the-new-nuclear-power. 
 69 See Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-of-
mark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See ZUBOFF, supra note 9. 
 72 See infra Section III.B.1. 
 73 The direct cause of these hearings was the Cambridge Analytica scandal.  See 
Confessore, supra note 45. 
 74 See BALKIN, supra note 14. 
 75 See LANIER, supra note 8. 
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In this business model, Facebook Inc. has an incentive to:  
1. encourage users to spend as much time as possible on 
the platform;  
2. have users share as much content and engage with as 
much content (including ads) as possible;  
3. collect and analyze the data about the engagement, 
also in a “provoked” manner, when Facebook Inc. not 
only observes how you react to a certain type of 
content but also periodically tests its hypotheses.  
This “engaged time spent on the platform” constitutes both an 
opportunity to sell more ads and an opportunity to constantly refine the 
ad-delivery system by testing new techniques, generating new 
knowledge about how to increase users’ time on Facebook and their 
chances of clicking on the ads.  Finally, it is in Facebook Inc.’s direct 
interest to demonstrate that ads run on its platform lead to actual 
purchases, even if these purchases are less reflective of actual consumer 
preferences and more reflective of the effectiveness of “targeted sales” 
techniques.76 
A more accurate restatement of the transactional relationship 
between Facebook Inc. and its individual users would be the following: 
We provide you “an interactive facebook,” with all its functionalities and 
access to an immense network of people you can communicate with.  In 
exchange, you agree that (i) we will collect information about all your 
connections and your behavior on our platform and beyond;77 (ii) we 
will use this information to tailor your experience in such a way that you 
spend as much time on our platform as possible so that we can collect 
even more information; and (iii) we will show you advertisements, 
based on data we collected about you and data we inferred about you 
from the large databases we have, in such a way that you click on as 
many as possible, and buy as much as possible. 
In this sense, logging into the facebook provided by Facebook Inc. 
is a little bit like walking into a casino.  Of course, you will derive some 
utility from being here, but you know that the casino is smarter than you 
and the environment is designed to squeeze money out of you, but you 
still accept that, with all the consequences for which we are not liable.78 
 
 76 See infra Section III.B.2. 
 77 See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook Will Now Show You Exactly How It Stalks You—
Even When You’re Not Using Facebook, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/01/28/off-facebook-activity-
page. 
 78 See Facebook Terms, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (especially 
Section 4.3, “Additional Provisions: Limits on Liability”).  
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 Note how this business model is neither a necessary nor “natural” 
way of financing the service Facebook Inc. provides.  It could give users 
the same functionalities and access to the same network without 
collecting so much data about them, without showing them ads, and 
without trying to convince them to spend even more time on the 
platform.  It could simply charge a subscription fee.  
For the sake of the argument, let us imagine that a competitor—
Greenbook Inc.—emerges and promises to collect no more data about 
users than strictly necessary to provide the service, show no ads, and 
instead charges users $12 a month.  Let us imagine that Facebook Inc. is 
legally required to allow Greenbook to be interoperable with its 
network and platform, suddenly creating a choice for consumers.  They 
can obtain access to the same, huge network of people, and many neat 
functionalities, either for $12 a month or for “free” with Facebook Inc.  
Why would anyone choose to switch?  The simplest answer would be 
that it is rational if the benefits exceed the costs.  
B.  Harms to Consumers: Higher “Prices” and Lower Quality 
1.  Cognitive Costs: Emotional Manipulation, Mental Health 
Problems 
Facebook Inc. inflicts cognitive costs on consumers by intentionally 
and unintentionally making them experience thoughts and emotions 
that, given a choice, they would prefer not to experience, or for which, 
in a competitive market, they would prefer to be compensated.  These 
cognitive costs include, among others, emotional manipulation and 
mental health problems. 
As far back as 2012, Facebook Inc. conducted an experiment on 
689,003 of its users aimed at testing whether the platform can influence 
what emotions its users experience based on what content they are 
being displayed.79  The authors of the study, published in 2014, wrote 
that, 
[e]motional states can be transferred to others via emotional 
contagion, leading people to experience the same emotions 
without their awareness. . . . In an experiment with people 
who use Facebook, we test whether emotional contagion 
occurs outside of in-person interaction between individuals 
by reducing the amount of emotional content in the News 
 
 79 Adam D. I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory & Jeffrey T. Hancock, Experimental Evidence 
of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks, 111 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 8788, 8788 (July 22, 2014), https://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/
8788; see also Kilovaty, supra note 9. 
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Feed.  When positive expressions were reduced, people 
produced fewer positive posts and more negative posts; when 
negative expressions were reduced, the opposite pattern 
occurred.  These results indicate that emotions expressed by 
others on Facebook influence our own emotions, constituting 
experimental evidence for massive-scale contagion via social 
networks.80 
This experiment has been widely criticized and led to media 
uproar,81 in part because Facebook Inc. did not receive the participants’ 
informed consent, nor did it compensate the users.  It was one of many 
similar experiments that Facebook Inc. conducted.82  The company later 
issued an apology, noting, however, that it had a right to behave in this 
way under its Terms of Service.83  In the aftermath of the scandal, 
Facebook Inc. stopped publishing scientific papers about its 
experiments; however, no evidence suggests that it stopped conducting 
such tests.  In other words, Facebook Inc. may still be conducting 
experiments, believing it has the right to do so, but simply not informing 
the public. 
Why would Facebook Inc. conduct such experiments?  In addition 
to researchers’ curiosity, there are good business reasons (contingent 
upon the business model) to be able to manipulate users’ emotions. 
First, research suggests that the emotions we experience influence 
our engagement with content, including with ads.  In particular, positive 
emotions lead to people sharing content more often, while negative 
emotions increase clicks on pages, including ads.84  Put simply, the 
ability to influence users’ emotions increases advertising campaigns’ 
effectiveness.  Second, the ability to influence users’ emotions leads to 
more data being generated.  Jaron Lanier suggests that negative 
 
 80 See Kramer, supra note 79, at 8788.   
 81 See Vindu Goel, Facebook Tinkers With Users’ Emotions in News Feed Experiment, 
Stirring Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/
technology/facebook-tinkers-with-users-emotions-in-news-feed-experiment-stirring-
outcry.html. 
 82 For an overview of all experiments that Facebook conducted on its users that 
observers were able to document, see Anya Zhukova, Facebook’s Fascinating (and 
Disturbing) History of Secret Experiments, MAKE USE OF (Apr. 27, 2017), 
https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/facebook-secret-experiments/. 
 83 See Samuel Gibbs, Facebook Apologises for Psychological Experiments on Users, 
GUARDIAN, (July 2, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/02/
facebook-apologises-psychological-experiments-on-users. 
 84 See Dan Baum, How Emotion Influences Buying Behavior (And Marketers Can Use 
it), IMPACT (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.impactplus.com/blog/emotion-influence-
buying-behavior; Peter Noel Murray, How Emotions Influence What We Buy, PSYCH. TODAY 
(Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/inside-the-consumer-
mind/201302/how-emotions-influence-what-we-buy. 
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emotions like fear, anger, and envy lead people to become more engaged 
and react more to content than do positive emotions.85  Third, this ability 
can help Facebook Inc. influence users to spend more time on the 
platform.86 
Facebook Inc. is in the business of marketing knowledge creation.  
Facebook Inc. collects raw data, creates cognitive knowledge about how 
people behave, and monopolizes the use of that knowledge in sales.  This 
is how the company makes money.  
Note that if Facebook Inc. was a research institution, it would need 
not only to abide by codes of ethics and obtain users’ informed consent 
for participation in such experiments87 but it would also need—most 
probably—to compensate the users for the time spent and/or negative 
emotional impact.  Hence, hidden experiments on users’ emotions and 
behavior, conducted without compensation, constitute a higher price 
than consumers could otherwise be paying. 
Moreover, several studies suggest that Facebook and other social 
media platforms increase the chance of experiencing psychological 
problems, including depression88 and feelings of loneliness.89  Arguably, 
instilling such emotions in users need not be Facebook Inc.’s goal, but it 
does constitute an unintended and tolerated negative consequence that, 
in a competitive market, could be avoided.  Of course, some level of 
negative psychological impacts—stemming from looking at “cool lives” 
of our “friends,” or looking at one’s phone instead of interacting with 
others in person, etc.—will always occur.90  To minimize such an effect, 
however, a company should be able to tell the user, “Hey, I think you 
spent enough time here today.”  And Facebook Inc. will never do that.  
Hence, the negative emotions experienced by Facebook’s users as a side 
 
 85 See LANIER, supra note 8. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Any researcher conducting experiments on human subjects knows that getting an 
ethical committee approval ex ante is a necessary condition for such an experiment to 
be justifiable.  For a discussion of various novel difficulties regarding informed consent 
in the current age, see contributions in BEYOND AUTONOMY: LIMITS AND ALTERNATIVES TO 
INFORMED CONSENT IN RESEARCH ETHICS AND LAW (David G. Kirchhoffer & Bernadette J. 
Richards eds., 2019). 
 88 See Denis Campbell, Depression in Girls Linked to Higher Use of Social Media, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/jan/04/
depression-in-girls-linked-to-higher-use-of-social-media. 
 89 See generally Melissa G. Hunt et al., No More FOMO: Limiting Social Media 
Decreases Loneliness and Depression, 37 J. SOC. CLINIC. PSYCH. 751 (2018). 
 90 Helmut Appel, Alexander L. Gerlach & Jan Crusius, The Interplay Between 
Facebook Use, Social Comparison, Envy, and Depression, 9 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCH. 44, 
44–49 (2016).  
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effect of using the platform constitute a lower quality of the product that 
could occur in a competitive market. 
Now let us imagine how in a competitive market, where Greenbook 
Inc. offers the same service that is financed through a subscription fee, 
the cognitive costs could be avoided.  As Greenbook Inc.’s revenue would 
not depend on targeted ads, the incentives to collect (and generate) data 
about the users’ behavior (including tracking them on other sites) 
would significantly decrease.  There would be no reason for Greenbook 
Inc. to want to manipulate users’ emotions, as it would not benefit from 
learning how they respond to content when they are angry, happy, or 
depressed.  Greenbook Inc. just wants users to keep paying the 
subscription fee.  As many users will want to retain access to the 
network of other facebooks’ customers, Greenbook Inc. will want to 
ensure that its customers enjoy their service more than that of the 
competitors.  And in light of growing psychological research about the 
negative consequences of Facebook Inc.’s business model, Greenbook 
Inc. could try to convince people that its platform is just much healthier 
for users’ minds.  It could, for example, give users an opportunity to 
design their own algorithms for content curation, or offer various modes 
like “happy mode” or “relax mode,” where the newsfeeds would be filled 
with content instilling positive emotional reactions.  Of course, to be 
able to do so, it would need some feedback as well.  The fundamental 
difference, however, would be the character of the relationship between 
the provider and the users.  Instead of spying on the latter and treating 
them as guinea pigs, the former would see them as partners.  It could 
collect feedback in a manner designed to ensure anonymity, just like 
social scientists do.  It could be transparent about the ways it filters 
content.  But most importantly, Greenbook Inc. would have an incentive 
to truly care about its users’ psychological wellbeing, as opposed to 
increasing their “engagement” at a high cognitive cost. 
Would all the psychological harms go away?  Of course not.  There 
is no way to make sure that your friend does not share a photo that 
triggers you or makes you unhappy.  There will always be situations 
when the user gets slightly depressed by looking at photos of her friends 
relaxing on the beach, or playing with their babies, or doing anything 
else.  Some of the psychological harms that users of facebooks suffer 
stem not from the service’s design but from a much broader set of 
problems present in our societies.  But the fundamental difference 
between Facebook Inc. and Greenbook Inc. is that the latter would not 
only not benefit from you experiencing the negative emotions but would 
also have an incentive to make sure that if you do not want to experience 
them you have a way to do so.  For example, you indicate on Greenbook, 
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“No vacations/baby/career photos today.”  You could tell Greenbook, 
“No political content today.”  Such an approach would engrain in the 
company’s business model a partnership between users and the 
company, wherein the company has an interest in users’ psychological 
wellbeing.91  
As of today, Facebook Inc. does not see you this way.  This is 
because being able to influence the way you feel (even if this means 
negative emotions) helps Facebook Inc. influence the way you behave.  
2.  Behavioral Costs: Behavioral Manipulation, Addiction, 
Wasted Time 
Facebook Inc. inflicts behavioral costs on its consumers by 
intentionally and unintentionally making them engage in conduct that, 
given a choice, they would prefer not to engage in or for which, in a 
competitive market, they would prefer to be compensated.  This 
includes both on-the-spot purchases caused by ads displayed by 
Facebook Inc. and spending more time on the platform than users would 
prefer to, including the possibility of addiction.92  Note that these costs 
are related to and, to a certain extent, depend upon the cognitive costs. 
As Facebook Inc.’s profits stem from advertising, it has an indirect 
incentive to prove that advertising through its channels increases sales.  
A good faith way of proving this increase is documenting actual sales 
increases (as opposed to lying about it to the advertisers, which is a 
separate problem).  One might wonder, however, if there is anything 
inherently wrong with increasing sales through effective advertising.  
From the microeconomic perspective, advertisements could be 
deemed to serve three functions.  They (i) spread information; (ii) shape 
preferences; and (iii) influence on-the-spot behavior.  Within the 
classical law and economics imaginary, the first function is good,93 the 
second is arguably neutral,94 and the third is potentially negative; for 
example, if it makes consumers act against their actual preferences.95  
How is this last instance possible?  Consider an example.  
 
 91 For a detailed explanation of why this is a paramount societal problem, and survey 
of ways achieve it, see Thomas E. Kadri, Networks of Empathy, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 1075, 
1083–93 (2020). 
 92 See Anindita Chakraborty, Facebook Addiction: An Emerging Problem, 11 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 7 (2016). 
 93 The “perfect information” assumption is a part of the “perfectly competitive 
markets” view.  See Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 
830–33 (2019). 
 94 Assuming that others can compete, NGOs can run their own campaigns, 
journalists can investigate, etc.  
 95 See Mik, supra note 20, at 14–16. 
PALKA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2021  10:51 AM 
2021] FIFTY (INTEROPERABLE) FACEBOOKS 1221 
Imagine you are driving home after a long day and plan to cook fish 
with vegetables for dinner, as you have these ingredients in the fridge, 
and your doctor told you to cut out meat and salt.  Suddenly the music 
on the radio stops and commercials begin.  You hear some fun music, 
people laughing, a sound of a fizzy drink being poured onto ice cubes, 
and then a pleasant voice says “Had a rough day?  Need to regenerate?  
Why wait?  Come to B-Burger for our dinner special of a quarter 
pounder with cheese, large fries, and a coke for $9.99.”  “Ok, that’s a good 
deal,” you think, and suddenly you can feel the emptiness of your 
stomach and saliva gathering in your mouth.  You take a turn and, ten 
minutes later, find yourself munching through a burger.  The burger is 
amazing for a while until you get back home and look at those poor 
veggies, which will go bad any day now, remembering that you really 
wanted to get healthier and realizing you did something you did not 
want to do.  You got tricked by an ad.96  Of course, one can argue that 
what you actually did was maximize your short-term preference, no 
matter how short it was.  But such an account has perfect explanatory 
power with zero predictive power—taken to the extreme, such a view 
would force us to believe that every choice a consumer makes, no matter 
how quickly she comes to regret it, is aligned with her preferences.  We 
need to be able to distinguish between people’s stable preferences and 
their wants triggered in moments of vulnerability created by hunger, 
exhaustion, or stress.97 
This phenomenon has been theorized by economists under various 
labels, including “hyperbolic discounting” and “time inconsistency.”98  
Ramsi Woodcock argues that ads steering consumer behavior in this 
 
 96 One term to describe such an occurrence is a “sludge.”  For a discussion on how to 
assess interventions that make a person undertake an action she would prefer not to 
undertake before doing so, and regrets after doing so, see CASS SUNSTEIN, ON FREEDOM 
(2019). 
 97 An interesting discussion about the concept of “vulnerability” of consumers is 
currently taking place in the European academia.  EU consumer law used to treat 
vulnerability as a static quality of certain kinds of consumers (children, the elderly, 
people with mental health problems, etc.).  But in a world where we can see ads and act 
on them anytime, everyone is potentially vulnerable every now and then.  I might be 
generally knowledgeable about the market, I might even be an expert, but when I am 
tired and stressed at the end of the day, I might make choices irrational even by my own 
standards.  Hence, the idea here is to reconceptualize vulnerability as dynamic state in 
which every consumer can sometimes find herself in.  For a discussion of this problem, 
as well as the potential implications for the consumer protection law, see N. Helberger, 
et al., EU Consumer Protection 2.0: Surveillance, Consent and the Vulnerable Consumer. 
Regaining Citizen Agency in the Information Economy, EUR. CONSUMER ORG., 12–20 (Sept. 
30, 2020) (manuscript with the author, available at https://www.beuc.eu). 
 98 See Matthew O. Jackson & Leeat Yariv, Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of 
Time Inconsistency, 7 AM. ECON. J. MICRO. 150 (2015); Geoffrey Heal, Discounting: A Review 
of the Basic Economics, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 59 (2007). 
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way (given, among others, the possibility of on-the-spot purchases 
online) is potentially illegal under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.99  In 
brief, this argument holds that with easy access to online information 
that ensures consumers can find what they really want, the social 
function of ads tends to be more and more about preference and 
behavioral manipulation.100  In this context, note how Facebook Inc.—
with its ability to reach you anytime, in any moment of vulnerability, 
maybe even caused by the platform itself, based on all the data it has 
about you and millions of others—can throw at you the “fast food dinner 
ad” on steroids.  Commercials are not only designed to be convincing in 
themselves (like the old radio stuff) but also tailored specifically for you.  
All this in the environment where you are just two clicks away from 
ordering and paying for the product online.  
Because consumers have no choice but to accept targeted 
advertising on Facebook, this constitutes a higher price for users.  
Moreover, as suggested above, Facebook Inc. has incentives to have its 
users spend as much time on the platform as possible.101  Acting upon 
that incentive—through the design of the interface/newsfeed’s 
algorithms—might lead consumers to spend more time on the platform 
than they would otherwise choose.  As a result, consumers receive a 
lower quality service.  Hence, service design increasing the engagement 
above the levels factually desired by the users constitutes a lower 
quality of the service.  Finally, the unintended behavioral consequence 
of Facebook Inc.’s activity might be social media addiction as 
demonstrated by researchers.102  
How would Greenbook diminish these costs?  First, when it comes 
to ads, the gain is rather evident—there would be no ads.  One unwanted 
purchase that you avoid every month renders the subscription cost 
worthwhile, even absent any other gains.  Second, when it comes to time 
spent on the platform and the risk of addiction, there is no incentive on 
Greenbook Inc.’s part to have you spend as much time as possible on the 
 
 99 See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Obsolescence of Advertising in the Information Age, 
127 YALE L.J. 2270, 2308 (2018) (“Persuasive advertising excludes competitors from the 
market for the advertised product, by making consumers prefer the advertised product 
over those of competitors.  This makes a monopolization claim under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, which attacks conduct that excludes competitors from markets, the 
appropriate vehicle for challenging advertising on antitrust grounds.  To prevail on a 
monopolization claim under section 2, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) has 
engaged in an illegal form of exclusionary conduct and (2) enjoys monopoly power in 
the market from which the defendant has excluded competitors.”) 
 100 Id. at 2299.  
 101 See BALKIN, supra note 14. 
 102 See Anindita Chakraborty, Facebook Addiction: An Emerging Problem, 11 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 7 (2016).  
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platform.  Greenbook Inc. wants you to keep paying the subscription fee.  
Once the money comes in, Greenbook Inc. is indifferent as to whether 
you spend five or sixty hours using it a month.  Because Greenbook Inc. 
does not incur costs when you limit your engagement, it could 
proactively help you spend less time on the platform.  For example, it 
could ask you how much time you wish to spend there and display a red 
pop-up when your daily/weekly limit is exceeded.  For Facebook Inc., 
that is a costly feature to have.  For Greenbook Inc., it might be a profit-
generating feature, as more people—generally unhappy with wasting 
time on social media but wishing to remain a part of the network—
would choose it over the competitors.  
Will this solve the problems of addiction and wasting time?  Again, 
not entirely.  As with every addiction, there are reasons beyond the 
features of the product that lead people to overuse it.  People might go 
to their facebook to numb their minds, to scroll, etc.; however, there is a 
difference between overusing something because we enjoy it (in the 
short term) and overusing it because it is made up of addictive 
components.103  Imagine that it is possible to produce tobacco or alcohol 
that does not cause physiological addiction.  Would that mean that 
people stop using it?  No, because some people like it.  Would it mean 
that no one would overuse it?  Again, no, because some people might like 
it so much that even absent the addiction they would still consume it in 
excess.  But if someone wanted to stop, quitting would be so much 
easier.  The difference between cigarettes and alcohol on the one hand 
and facebooks on the other is that we are not able to produce the former 
in a less addictive form, whereas we absolutely can with the latter.  The 
reason is that unlike with substances like cigarettes or alcohol, the 
features of the facebook product are not the same ones that make it 
addictive—the features of the business model are.  And the business 
model could be different.  
In these two subsections, we analyzed how a different business 
model could disincentivize facebooks operators from using data for 
nefarious purposes.  But the problem with Facebook Inc. is not just the 
abuse of data—it is also privacy and security itself.  The mere 
availability of data about our lives stored somewhere is potentially 
costly.  Let us see how that could be avoided.  
 
 103 For specialized references to the literature suggesting that online platforms are 
currently designed to addict, see Rosenquist & Scott Morton, supra note 12, at 2 (“The 
stimuli produced by digital platforms are not physical substances consumed by the body 
such as recreational and prescribed drugs, however, their effects on the brain follow the 
same common pathway of reward through the nucleus accumbens, which in turn 
regulates pathways of addiction.”). 
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3.  Privacy (as Security) Costs: Opportunity Makes the Thief 
Facebook Inc. imposes “privacy as security” costs on its users by 
amassing unnecessary (from the technical point of view) data, capable 
of being stolen by hackers.  This is a potential cost that users will bear if 
the breach occurs, potentiality being subject to uncertainty.104 
As noted at the beginning of this subsection, “privacy” tends to be 
treated as an “umbrella” category for all the data-related harms.  
Traditionally, at least within American privacy torts jurisprudence, 
privacy has been associated with disclosure of information about one’s 
private life against the will of the person whom this information 
concerns.105  In the current socio-technological reality, there are two 
ways in which this type of “disclosure” by Facebook Inc. can occur: (i) 
intentional sharing of personally indefinable information by the 
company and (ii) a security breach (data leak).  Leaving the discussions 
about the former to legal scholars interested in the nitty-gritty of the 
privacy law theories, I would like to focus on the latter, significant from 
in terms of this paper’s argument.  
Facebook Inc. has been involved with scandals concerning hacking 
and data leaks/breaches when third parties illegally obtained access to 
users’ data.106  There are many reasons why these types of breaches are 
harmful to consumers,107 including the fact that hackers, unlike 
Facebook Inc., are not in a business relationship with users and have no 
market (or other) incentives against publicly sharing this data or using 
it to blackmail the users.108 
Hence, the fact that Facebook Inc. chooses to construct its business 
model around extensive data collection about the users, given the risk 
of hacking, lowers the quality of service provided to users, constituting 
a higher price that consumers will (potentially) have to pay if or when a 
breach materializes.  Conversely, in a competitive market, where other 
 
 104 It is also a risk that users incur, given the impossibility of knowing the probability.  
For the distinction, see FRANK KNIGHT, RISK UNCERTAINTY & PROFIT (1921).  
 105 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (enumerating four 
types of privacy torts: “1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his 
private affairs; 2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; 3. 
Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 4. Appropriation, for 
the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness”); Samuel D. Warren & 
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 106 See Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Security Breach Exposes Accounts of 50 
Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/28/
technology/facebook-hack-data-breach.html. 
 107 See Kilovaty, supra note 10, at 1184. 
 108 For an argument that a legal obligation of this sort should exist between the users 
and the platforms, see Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016).  
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facebook providers could adopt different business models, the 
protection of users’ privacy and security could stem from their less data-
heavy conduct.  More competition in the facebooks market would 
benefit consumer privacy and data security. 
Of course, Greenbook Inc. would still store some data—potentially 
a great amount of it.  In a way, a facebook is about storing and sharing 
information.  Nevertheless, the amount and the kind of data stored 
would differ.  As of now, Facebook Inc. has an incentive to store not only 
the data you provide (photos, posts, live events, friendships, occupation, 
etc.) but also data about your behavior on-platform and off-platform.  
The amount of time you spent there, what articles you click, how you 
react to all the posts, what time of a day you visit what websites—all this 
information can be and is being monetized.  For Greenbook Inc., no such 
incentive exists.  Simply put, Greenbook would collect much fewer data 
about you than Facebook does, even if you were using it in exactly the 
same way.  This lowers the potential costs that occur when a hack 
happens—the Cambridge Analytics scandal, by definition, would have 
no factual chance of occurring on Greenbook.  
4.  Free Riding on Users’ Intellectual Property and Labor 
Facebook Inc. harms users by free riding on their creative content, 
including their copyright-protected content and their labor, understood 
as data creation and service improvement.109  In a competitive market, 
users would choose to be compensated for the value they provide to the 
platform.  
One of the reasons Facebook is such an appealing platform to spend 
time on is that it allows users to engage with creative content.  The 
pictures you upload, the funny or exciting posts you write, or the 
comments you scribble are not only a way for you to express yourself, 
for others to stay in touch with you, but also for Facebook Inc. to retain 
its high user base that “enjoys” all this content.  
As some of the content that people upload is copyright protected, 
Facebook Inc. needs a license to display it legally.  Any future facebook 
provider willing to allow users to make their photos and posts available 
to the public will need some license from a user, assuming the content 
passes the threshold of copyright protection.110  Specifically, the 
provider will need a license to copy, display, and make the content 
 
 109 See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 11, at 207–09. 
 110 In this case, the most important test is “originality.”  For an overview of the ways 
various jurisdictions define this concept, see Elizabeth F. Judge & Daniel Gervais, Of Silos 
and Constellations: Comparing Notions of Originality in Copyright Law, 
27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 375 (2009). 
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available to other users, depending on how the platform uses the 
content.111 
The business conditions of this license, however, are not in any way 
predetermined.  Specifically, the fact that the license is royalty-free—
users do not get paid, even if millions see their posts—is Facebook Inc.’s 
business decision, which is easy to force upon users because Facebook 
Inc. is a monopolist.  Nevertheless, these conditions constitute a cost.  In 
Facebook Inc.’s Terms of Service, we read: 
The permissions you give us: 
. . . .  
 . . . Nothing in these Terms takes away the rights you have to 
your own content.  You are free to share your content with 
anyone else, wherever you want. 
 However, to provide our services we need you to give us 
some legal permissions (known as a ‘license’) to use this 
content.  This is solely for the purposes of providing and 
improving our Products and services as described in Section 1 
above.  
 Specifically, when you share, post, or upload content that is 
covered by intellectual property rights on or in connection 
with our Products, you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, 
sub-licensable, royalty-free, and worldwide license to host, use, 
distribute, modify, run, copy, publicly perform or display, 
translate, and create derivative works of your content 
(consistent with your privacy and application settings).112 
As you might notice by looking at the emphasized portions of the 
texts, Facebook Inc.’s wording is misleading, and this contractual 
provision is by no means the only possible one.  Facebook Inc. claims 
that they need a license to display your IP-created content, which is true.  
To do so, however, Facebook Inc. does not need a royalty-free license.  It 
could agree to pay you a share of the profits it makes.  Such sharing need 
not be automatic; the provider could require a minimum number of 
engagements with your content before paying you.  But the fact that 
Facebook Inc. does not allow you to participate in the profits from your 





 111 See 17 U.S.C. § 106; U.S. Copyright Office, Making Available Study, COPYRIGHT.GOV, 
https://www.copyright.gov/docs/making_available (last visited Apr. 8, 2021). 
 112 See Facebook Terms, supra note 50, at § 3 (emphasis added).  
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Many other platforms that make a business of giving people access 
to creative content (YouTube, Spotify, Netflix, etc.) do share profits with 
the content creators.113  The difference is such that these creators are 
often either represented by professional agents or have explicitly 
transferred their copyright to producers—read, corporations—with 
bargaining power sufficient to demand compensation. 
Moreover, on top of the right to profit from users’ creative content 
without remuneration, Facebook Inc. also benefits from free riding on 
users’ labor.114  All the activities that users engage in—from tagging 
their friends on photos to rating businesses or translations to reacting 
to others’ posts—are sources of data that Facebook Inc. uses to train its 
facial recognition, translation, and ad algorithms.  This is not data that 
Facebook Inc. collects about users.  This is data that users produce for 
Facebook Inc., for free. 
Imagine I run a start-up company that creates various machine-
learning-based tools.  To train my algorithms, I need annotated data.115  
Someone must tag it (indicate what is on the picture, or how to translate 
a given word, or whether a news article contains a happy or sad story).  
Imagine I ask you to spend two hours a week: (i) marking the faces of 
people you know on photos I show you; (ii) correcting my translations; 
and (iii) marking if the things I show you make you laugh, angry, sad, or 
surprised.  Through this labor of yours, combined with the work of 
millions of other people, I can create robust, reliable, and profitable 
instances of machine-learning-powered tools, or what is now commonly 
referred to as “artificial intelligence.”116  You might agree to do this for 
me, but you will ask for money.  The laborer deserves her payment.  And 
yet, in the case of Facebook Inc., more than two billion laborers provide 
this work for free.  
Note that Facebook Inc. neither has to collect the data from users 
to improve its services (it could just as well hire external contractors to 
provide the data) nor keep all the profits to itself.  This a business 
decision made in an environment with no competitor offering payment 
or a better deal for consumers.  This is a decision a monopolist made to 
impose costs on users and extract all the surplus.  The lack of royalties 
for your IP-protected content, from which Facebook Inc. benefits, and 
 
 113 James H. Richardson, The Spotify Paradox: How the Creation of a Compulsory 
License Scheme for Streaming On-Demand Music Platforms Can Save the Music Industry, 
22 UCLA ENTM’T L. REV. 46, 57–62 (2014). 
 114 Jamal Robinson, How Facebook Scales Machine Learning, MEDIUM (Feb 3, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@jamal.robinson/how-facebook-scales-artificial-intelligence-
machine-learning-693706ae296f; see also POSNER & WEYL, supra note 11, at 207–09. 
 115 See ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING: THE NEW AI 29–54 (2016). 
 116 See id. at 17–20.  
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the lack of salary for the labor you provide by producing data it will use 
to train its algorithms are a part of the price you are currently paying for 
access to Facebook Inc.’s service. 
Greenbook Inc.—or some other competitor—could choose to pay 
users a share of their profits for the value of their content and labor, as 
Spotify and YouTube do.  Of course, this would not be a lot of money for 
most people.  Still, there is no reason why it should stay with the 
monopolist.  
To sum up, this Part explored exactly why using Facebook is not 
“free” and analyzed the types of costs it imposes on consumers, going 
beyond “data and attention” (cognitive, behavioral, and privacy-security 
harms, as well as Facebook Inc.’s free riding on users’ content and 
labor).  This Part also tried to imagine how, in a competitive market, 
consumers could, and would, either refuse to suffer those harms (by 
choosing a different provider) or require compensation.  In short, I 
argued that interoperability in the market for facebooks is necessary to 
increase competition and that competition is necessary to lower the 
costs to consumers. 
IV.  TOWARD THE WORLD OF FIFTY FACEBOOKS 
In this final Part, I sketch the possible ways of getting from where 
we are today to the world of fifty facebooks.  First, I take a closer look at 
the concept of interoperability as used in the existing legal discourse, 
survey the state of the art, and apply it to the problem of facebooks.  
Second, I look at the role of regulation and antitrust enforcement in 
facilitating the competitive market in facebooks, as well as preventing 
certain types of abusive behavior by providers.  Third, I survey several 
commonplace objections to the interoperability of online platforms, 
including innovation, privacy and security, property, and distributive 
effects.  Finally, I offer a brief reflection on the possibility of scaling up 
the idea presented in this paper to other platforms.  
A.  Interoperability 
The reader will have noticed that I have not defined 
“interoperability” until now.  I wanted the argument to proceed bottom-
up, from the single case study of Facebook Inc., and not top-down, from 
some abstract definition of “interoperability.”  In other words, I wanted 
us first to imagine, in several ways, what the world of fifty facebooks 
could look like and why it would be beneficial before getting into the 
details of how it could work from the technical perspective.  This is 
because, at least from the perspective of this paper’s argument, 
interoperability is a means to the end of higher consumer welfare, not a 
PALKA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2021  10:51 AM 
2021] FIFTY (INTEROPERABLE) FACEBOOKS 1229 
goal in itself.117  This is not to say that we should not aim for a more 
interoperable internet as the goal118—on the contrary, I believe we 
probably should;119 it is just not the argument I tried to advance in this 
Article.  Nevertheless, one should remember that numerous scholars 
have explored, and several national and transnational reports have 
taken up, the idea of interoperability in information technologies, 
including the interoperability of platforms.120  Building on this work, let 
us try to better define it and distinguish certain key concepts. 
Put simply, products are interoperable if they can work together.  
This means different things depending on the context.  For example, if 
you have an iPhone and a contract with AT&T, and I have a Samsung 
phone and use T-Mobile, we can text and call one another; this means 
that various phones and various telephone providers are horizontally 
interoperable.  If you can charge your headphones with the USB charger 
you got when buying a hair trimmer, then the charger and the device are 
vertically interoperable.  On the contrary, Apple chargers and non-Apple 
devices are not interoperable.  Further, you can open a PDF file in dozens 
of readers or access most websites with several web browsers because 
the files and the software are interoperable.  On the contrary, if you can 
only listen to an audiobook you bought from Amazon using the Audible 
app, this means that the file is not interoperable with other programs. 
 
 117 For an argument that we should generally treat interoperability as a means to an 
end, not a goal valuable in itself, see Wolfgang Kerber & Heike Schweitzer, 
Interoperability in the Digital Economy, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 
39, 58 (2017).  
 118 For an argument that interoperability is valuable as goal in itself, see Cory 
Doctorow, Interoperability: Fix the Internet, Not the Tech Companies, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (July 11, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/07/interoperability-fix-
internet-not-tech-companies. 
 119 See infra Section IV.D. 
 120 See OPENING STANDARDS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTEROPERABILITY (Laura DeNardis 
ed., 2011); JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF HIGHLY 
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS (2012); Inge Graef, Mandating Portability and Interoperability in 
Online Social Networks: Regulatory and Competition Law Issues in the European Union, 
39 TELECOMM. POL’Y 502 (2015); Chris Riley, Unpacking Interoperability in Competition, 5 
J. CYBER POL’Y 94 (2020); BRITISH COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTH., ONLINE PLATFORMS AND 
DIGITAL ADVERTISING: MARKET STUDY FINAL REPORT (2020), https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/media/5efc57ed3a6f4023d242ed56/Final_report_1_July_2020_.pdf 
(United Kingdom); JACQUES CRÉMER, YVES-ALEXANDRE DE MONTJOYE & HEIKE SCHWEITZER, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ERA (2019), 
https://cnnumerique.fr/files/uploads/2020/ra-cnnum-concurrence-web(1).pdf 
(European Union); L’étude de cas sur l’interopérabilité des réseaux sociaux, CONSEIL 
NATIONAL DU NUMÉRIQUE (July 2020), https://cnnumerique.fr/Interoperabilite_
Concurrence_Etude (France); THE STIGLER REPORT, supra note 12, at 113–18 (United 
States). 
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John Palfrey and Urs Gasser define interoperability, in the context 
of information technologies, as “the ability to transfer and render useful 
data and other information across systems, applications, or 
components.”121  They nuance the definition by distinguishing four 
layers of interoperability: technological, data, human, and 
institutional.122  The lesson to be learned from their work is that 
interoperability is much more than just passing a law or developing 
technical standards.  Concrete technical issues are a legion, and a lot of 
possible ways of achieving the goals exist (including both private and 
public interventions, and both unilateral and cooperative actions).123  
Moreover, interoperability is as much about imagination and 
willingness to change things as it is about technicalities.  Or, in Palfrey 
and Gasser’s words, “[t]he problems associated with interop are just as 
much about culture as they are about technology.”124 
Applying their insights to the question of facebooks’ 
interoperability, one will notice that, at least in theory, it could emerge 
based on Facebook Inc.’s unilateral decisions.  Especially where vertical 
interoperability is concerned, there have always been many apps 
running on Facebook.125  From the business perspective, Facebook Inc. 
benefits from additional apps increasing its platform’s “utility” to users.  
The trouble is that, as of today, Facebook Inc. retains full control over 
who can offer services vertically interoperable with its platform and 
under what conditions they may do so.  Hence, it might disallow certain 
apps once it considers them to be too competitive (as it did with Vine)126 
or generally keep certain functionalities fully to itself (like content 
filtering and moderation).  Moreover, it has never voluntarily allowed 
horizontal interoperability.  Here is where we need to categorize 




 121 PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 120, at 5. 
 122 Id. at 6. 
 123 Id. at 14–15. 
 124 Id. at 5.  
 125 One example are games developed by Zynga Inc., most notably Farmville.  See 
Demetrius Williams, The Rise and Fall of Zynga: A Cautionary Tale for Mobile Game 
Developers, TRANSLATE MEDIA (June 7, 2017), https://www.translatemedia.com/
translation-blog/rise-fall-zynga-cautionary-tale-game-developers.  
 126 Adi Robertson, Mark Zuckerberg Personally Approved Cutting Off Vine’s Friend-
Finding Feature, VERGE (Dec. 8, 2018, 10:35 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/
12/5/18127202/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-vine-friends-api-block-parliament-
documents. 
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Cory Doctorow, understanding interoperability as “the technical 
ability to plug one product or service into another product or service,” 
distinguishes between indifferent, cooperative, and adversarial 
interoperability.127  Indifferent interoperability occurs when one 
company is not concerned with the actions of the other; cooperative 
interoperability is when two parties actually cooperate to ensure the 
interoperability (for instance, developers of apps for a new operating 
system or cases for telephones).128  Adversarial interoperability, on the 
other hand, occurs when one party makes its product work with another 
without the permission, and often against the will, of the other product’s 
producer.129  This is the case of Facebook Inc.  Zuckerberg’s giant has no 
wish to become interoperable with other services unless it approves of 
each and every cooperation.  Doctorow’s insight matters profoundly, as 
it draws our attention to the fact that interoperability, on top of being a 
problem of technology and culture, is a problem of interests and power.  
That is why, sometimes, the government needs to mandate 
interoperability.130  This, however, can happen in many different ways.  
Let us look at what those are. 
B.  Regulation for, and of, Competition 
We should keep in mind the distinction between regulation as a 
means of obliging Facebook Inc. to open up to competition on the one 
hand and regulation as means of governing the world of fifty facebooks 
on the other.  Whereas the former is not the only way to go (the company 
could be obliged to open up because of antitrust enforcement or choose 
to do so voluntarily), the latter will most certainly be necessary to, first, 
sustain the interoperability of services and, second, account for certain 
types of externalities.  
 
 127 See Doctorow, supra note 118. 
 128 Id. 
 129 For an overview of articles advancing the concept, see Cory Doctorow, Adversarial 
Interoperability, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2019/10/adversarial-interoperability. 
 130 See Bennett Cyphers & Cory Doctorow, A Legislative Path to an Interoperable 
Internet, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 28, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/
07/legislative-path-interoperable-internet (“If Facebook and Twitter allowed anyone to 
fully and meaningfully interoperate with them, their size would not protect them from 
competition nearly as much as it does.  But platforms have shown that they won’t choose 
to do so on their own.  That’s where governments can step in: regulations could require 
that large platforms offer a baseline of interoperable interfaces that anyone, including 
competitors, can use.  This would set a ‘floor’ for how interoperable very large platforms 
must be.  It would mean that once a walled garden becomes big enough, its owner needs 
to open up the gates and let others in.”). 
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First, consider regulation as the means for obliging Facebook Inc. 
to open up and give competitors access to its service and network.  The 
United States Congress or the European Union could pass a law 
requiring that facebook operators make themselves open to and 
interoperable with other services on this market.  In fact, first steps in 
that direction have already been taken, with the ACCESS Act in the US131 
(currently in stalemate) and the newly proposed Digital Services Act in 
the EU.132  As of today, however, no such requirement exists.  The precise 
content of such an obligation depends on the political choices made.  For 
example, one can imagine the government requiring that Facebook Inc. 
adopt certain standards but allowing it to develop those standards in 
cooperation with the industry.  This would be a mix of a publicly 
mandated interop, the details of which the private actors work out.  
Alternatively, the government could mandate not only adoption but 
certain standards as well.133  Moreover, one should remember that on 
top of mandating interoperability, the lawmakers might have to remove 
certain legislative instruments currently allowing platforms to block 
access technically, sometimes even through criminal actions, like the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.134  Such a move is already foreseen 
(subject to limitations) in the DSA135 when it comes to research, and in 
the DMA when it comes to competitors.136 
What precisely the enforcement mechanisms for these rules should 
be is a question beyond this paper’s scope.  One option is monetary fines 
for refusing to open up to competition via interoperability, issued by one 
of the existing regulatory agencies—the most obvious candidate in the 
United States being either the FCC or the FTC—or a new agency focusing 
on various new technology-related problems.137  Alternatively, one can 
imagine granting competitors private rights of action, a “right to 
 
 131 For a discussion of its contents and potential to facilitate interoperability, see 
Kadri, supra note 3, at 36–37. 
 132 In the European Union, interoperability is hinted at, but at this point formally 
required only in vertical relations.  See Jan Penfrat, How the Parliament Stakes Out Its 
DSA Position, EUR. DIGITAL RTS. (Oct. 21, 2020), https://edri.org/our-work/how-the-
parliament-stakes-out-its-dsa-position. 
 133 See Cyphers & Doctorow, supra note 130. 
 134 See Kadri, supra note 3, at 30 (arguing that “Congress should amend the CFAA to 
clarify that the statute is inapplicable to publicly accessible websites”). 
 135 See the DSA, supra note 33, art. 31.  
 136 See the DMA, supra note 34, art. 6. 
 137 For examples of voices proposing creation of new “digital” agencies, regulating 
(certain aspects) of the operations of tech companies, see generally Ryan Calo, Robotics 
and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALI. L. REV. 513 (2015); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for 
Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 (2017); see also Chapter IV, Section 1 of the DSA, supra 
note 33, at 67–74 (proposing digital service coordinators).  
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interoperability,” and a possibility to sue Facebook Inc. (or anyone else) 
if they refuse access.  
Second, once we achieve this goal of creating the world of fifty 
facebooks, we will need to regulate this market.  On the one hand, issues 
like technical standards for interoperability, safety standards, 
transparency, and accountability rules make up essential elements of 
the legal landscape for sustaining the “world of fifty facebooks.”  We 
need to be sure that a user of A-Book can communicate with a user of B-
Book.  Importantly, we must allow users that currently have accounts 
on Facebook to migrate to these other services with their existing 
content and connections.138  We also need to significantly increase the 
societal ability to monitor the activities of facebook providers.139  On the 
other hand, given the existence of externalities in the data-driven 
world,140 we might want to ban certain types of activities like 
discrimination and manipulation altogether.  
Thomas Kadri insightfully points out that, with easier data flows, 
the risks of data abuse, including privacy risks, might increase.  In his 
words, “If Congress facilitates data collection and interoperability in the 
ways I propose, it will become essential for legislators to pass a 
comprehensive data privacy law as well.  The United States still lacks 
legislation to regulate privacy in many aspects of our daily lives.”141  
Kadri calls for a federal privacy regulation, akin to the EU’s GDPR or the 
 
 138 One of the legal tools that consumers and emerging competitors could make use 
of is the right to “data portability,” currently granted to the residents of the European 
Union.  See Inge Graef, Martin Husovec & Nadezhda Purtova, Data Portability and Data 
Control: Lessons for an Emerging Concept in EU Law, 19 GERMAN L.J. 1359, 1361 (2018). 
 139 See Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age 
of Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1563 (2019) (“An irony of the information age is 
that the companies responsible for the most extensive surveillance of individuals in 
history—large platforms such as Amazon, Facebook, and Google—have themselves 
remained unusually shielded from being monitored by government regulators.”).  A lot 
of provisions of the DSA foresee such mechanisms.  See, e.g., the DSA, supra note 33, arts. 
13, 19, 23, 24, 28, 30, 33.  
 140 See Pałka, supra note 65, at 595 (“By allowing a company to collect and study 
information about myself, even if we assume I am fully aware of what they plan to do 
with my data, I impose a cost on (or at least make a decision about) you and other people.  
If I make it clear what my political views or religious convictions are, essentially 
everything I do online can later be used to infer knowledge about other people’s religion 
and politics.  ‘Everything you say can and will be used against other people’ would be a 
fair statement to include in the privacy policies written within the ‘notice and choice’ 
paradigm.  The more things I buy on Amazon, the more refined suggestions to other 
customers will be.  If I am convinced, or not convinced, by a political ad, I help ensure 
that its next reiteration will be even more successful in manipulating people’s 
preferences and behavior.  Even if I fully agree to the collection of my data, I impose 
costs on you and our fellow humans.  I should not be allowed to do this so easily.”). 
 141 Kadri, supra note 3, at 38. 
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California Consumer Privacy Act.142  This is definitely necessary but 
arguably insufficient.  One should remember that these instruments are 
aimed mostly at ensuring fairness in data processing by endowing 
individuals with certain rights and introducing transparency and 
accountability requirements.143  They do not, however, speak to the 
legality of particular purposes of data processing, like content or ad 
personalization, nor to problems like data-driven discrimination144 or 
manipulation.145  The emergence of competition may take care of some 
of these problems, but we must outlaw others across the board.  How 
exactly to proceed is not predetermined; on the contrary, a democratic 
and political process should help us establish that.146 
Similar to regulation, antitrust enforcement could play a dual role 
in creating the world of fifty facebooks.  On the one hand, direct antitrust 
action against Facebook Inc. could be the means of obliging it to open up 
to the competition.  This could happen under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act147 in the United States or under Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).148  Both of these provisions 
forbid abuse of the dominant position on a given geographical and 
product market.149  Enforcement actions by the FTC or the European 
Commission could be the way of legally obliging Facebook Inc. to open 
up to the competition.  The chances, given the current jurisprudence in 
the US and the EU, seem rather low; however, with the large wave of 
progressive thought urging us to rethink the antitrust right now,150 a 
change in practice might be on the horizon.  The newly initiated FTC 
lawsuit against Facebook Inc. is a perfect start to requiring the company 
 
 142 See id.  
 143 For an overview of consumer rights and transparency requirements in the GDPR 
and the CCPA, see ONETRUST DATAGUIDANCE &FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, COMPARING PRIVACY 
LAWS: GDPR V. CCPA (2018). 
 144 See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALI. 
L. REV. 671 (2016). 
 145 See Kilovaty, supra note 9. 
 146 See Viljoen, supra note 64. 
 147 Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7. 
 148 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
102, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47.  
 149 See id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.  
 150 See BILL BAER, JONATHAN B. BAKER, MICHAEL KADES, FIONA SCOTT MORTON, NANCY L. ROSE, 
CARL SHAPIRO & TIM WU, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH, RESTORING COMPETITION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A VISION FOR ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND 
CONGRESS (Nov. 2020), https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/restoring
competition.pdf; Jonathan B Baker, Jonathan Sallet & Fiona Scott Morton, Unlocking 
Antitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1916 (2017); Guggenberger, supra note 5; Khan, 
supra note 24; Ramsi Woodcock, The Antitrust Case for Consumer Primacy in Corporate 
Governance, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1395 (2020).  
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to open up.151  Here one should remember that the lawsuit does not need 
to end up with a court judgment, but quite possibly will result in a 
settlement.  The FTC, when it comes to the negotiations, should push for 
horizontal interoperability in the market for facebooks. 
On the other hand, adequately enforced antitrust law, especially 
mergers and acquisitions control, will be an essential tool for 
guaranteeing that a new monopolist will not re-emerge.  Here, the tool 
to bear in mind is Section 7 of the Clayton Act in the United States, which 
prohibits mergers and acquisitions if the outcome “substantially [] 
lessen[s] competition, or [] tend[s] to create a monopoly.”152  The FTC 
lawsuit against Facebook Inc. is a tremendous step in that direction.  In 
addition, the antitrust laws might help with fighting against the 
emergence of cartels and collusive behavior that Article 101 of TFEU in 
the EU and Section 1 of the Sherman Act in the United States prohibit.  
Also, these tools will be crucial to ensuring that after the emergence of 
the world of fifty facebooks, we will not gradually return to where we 
are now.  
In sum, the legal intervention should focus on (i) obliging Facebook 
Inc. to open up to competition; (ii) sustaining interoperability and 
competition in the market for facebooks; and (iii) mitigating certain 
horizontal risks in this market, like privacy, security, manipulation, and 
discrimination.  There is no one best way to achieve all these aims; in 
this Section, I wanted to sketch an overview of the available tools.  
C.  Objections 
Having provided an argument for the law to mandate 
interoperability in the market for facebooks, I would like to begin 
wrapping up this Article by addressing several objections that have 
been raised regarding interoperability in general.  I do not claim to 
refute them here—doing so in one short section would necessarily 
require turning them into straw persons, which I would strongly prefer 
to avoid.  But for the sake of the argument, I want to signal what these 
objections are and hint at the pathways for addressing them.  These 
include: (a) privacy and security risks; (b) risk of increased 
homogeneity and stifling of innovation; (c) proprietary claims of the 
large platforms; (d) distributive effects privileging the rich at the 
expense of the poor; and (e) lowering the reliability of regulatory 
oversight that platforms currently undertake.  
 
 151 See the FTC’s Facebook lawsuit press release, supra note 2. 
 152 Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (original version at ch. 323, § 7, 
38 Stat. 730 (1914)). 
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Let us start with privacy and security.153  One could argue that as 
long as Facebook Inc. keeps all the data to itself, given its expertise and 
available funds, the privacy risks are lower than they would be in the 
world of fifty facebooks.  In the end, it is easier to keep one set of servers 
secure than fifty such sets.  Moreover, closed APIs guarantee that no 
nefarious actors (like Cambridge Analytica) can get access to the data 
which they would abuse.  Opening them up necessarily comes with 
privacy risks.  This objection is a very serious one, and lawmakers 
should definitely keep it in mind.  A couple of points should be made, 
however.  First, as noted in the Section above, we need to pair mandated 
interoperability with legal requirements for security and privacy.  The 
problem is not that Facebook Inc. is super secure but the competitors 
would not be; the problem is that a general consumer privacy law is way 
past due.  Second, as I have argued already,154 part of the problem is that 
Facebook Inc. currently amasses much more data about consumers than 
necessary.  In a competitive market, business models offering to collect 
much fewer data could emerge, thereby lowering the stakes of a 
potential hack.  
Further, we might fear that introducing standards (either through 
the government or through the industry) will lead to a higher 
homogeneity on the market and stifle innovation.155  This objection 
holds water where interoperability as a general concept is concerned. In 
the case of facebooks, however, we are already dealing with only one 
product on the market.  Introducing competition through mandated 
interoperability will lead to innovation when it comes to both 
functionalities and business models. 
The question of innovation is closely linked with property 
concerns.  Advocates for business freedom could argue that Facebook 
Inc. has created a neat product and so forcing it to open up to 
competition violates the company’s right to do with their proprietary 
algorithms and platform as they see fit.  There are two ways to read this 
objection: deontological (it is simply unfair to take revenue streams 
away from Facebook Inc., who invented a facebook) or consequentialist 
(the company invested a lot in it, and so forcing it to open up to 
competition will lead to lower returns and might disincentivize future 
innovators).  The former version of the objection definitely points to a 
real issue; however, it is conveniently silent about the amount of value 
 
 153 For a specification of this objection, and detailed analysis and partial rebuttal, see 
PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 120, at 75–88. 
 154 See supra Section III.B.3. 
 155 For a specification of this objection, and detailed analysis and partial rebuttal, see 
PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 120, at 111–27. 
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that Facebook Inc. extracts from its users already—from datafication of 
their lives156 to free riding on their content and labor.157  Hence, the legal 
intervention proposed in this Article does not violate an innocent actor’s 
rights; it limits the profitability of a business model predicated on value 
extraction from billions of people.  The latter consequentialist version 
of the objection overlooks the simple fact that once the market opens 
up, a huge incentive to innovate emerges.  Of course, one might concede 
that mandated interoperability in the market for facebooks will stifle 
innovation in new areas.  The right to monopoly profit, however, 
(granted through patents, for example) is always limited in time,158 and 
Facebook Inc. has had its share already.  
Another serious objection points to the distributive effects of the 
intervention proposed in this paper.  If we imagine that a new 
competitor emerges and offers a facebook service for a subscription fee, 
richer consumers might switch, whereas poorer ones may be stuck with 
the toxic business model and incur even higher costs than now (as 
Facebook Inc. will need to, somehow, make up for the lost profit).  This 
phenomenon might occur both domestically and internationally, where 
Facebook Inc. will try to squeeze out more profits in geographical 
markets other than the US and the EU.  This objection is important, and 
lawmakers should keep it in mind when designing the detailed policy.  It 
does not have to materialize, however.  First, public campaigns about 
the harmful effects of using Facebook might convince some people that 
$12 is worth the time and mental health they will save by switching.  
Second, the horizontal regulation might render some of the most toxic 
kinds of data-driven harms unlawful.  Third, the choice will not have to 
be binary—between either a subscription fee or Facebook Inc.—as it is 
today.  More competitors might emerge and still offer services “for free” 
and display ads, but without the constant data collection and “tricking” 
consumers into purchases. 
Finally, there is the question of public policy oversight that private 
companies like Facebook Inc. conduct.  Rory Van Loo has documented 
and scrutinized the extent to which this phenomenon already widely 
occurs, including the FTC’s conscription of Facebook Inc. to police third-
party apps offered on its platform.159  Given the number of companies 
 
 156 See COHEN, supra note 9; ZUBOFF, supra note 9.  Platforms have become both key 
drivers of the datafication of important resources and active legal entrepreneurs, 
pursuing powerful strategies for ensuring their continued access to and de facto control 
of the data on which they rely.  COHEN, supra note 9, at 48. 
 157 See supra Section III.B.  
 158 See Guggenberger, supra note 5, at 8. 
 159 See Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers, 106 VA. 
L. REV. 467, 482–83 (2020). 
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operating online, companies like Facebook Inc. have the resources to 
perform oversight activities;160 and having just one Facebook makes it 
easier to hold the private enforcer accountable.161  Once there are fifty 
facebooks, the smaller ones might have trouble performing oversight, 
and making sure that every single one of them does not abuse its 
oversight powers will become much more costly and difficult.  This is 
also a serious objection.  Each facebook does not need to perform this 
private oversight separately, however—a vertically interoperable 
company could do so.  One could imagine all facebooks chipping in to 
fund such a company for example, in a way proportionate to their 
market share. 
In sum, there are many objections one could raise against the idea 
of legally mandated interoperability in the market for facebooks.  But 
even if each of them is based on a sound concern, none of them seem to 
defeat the idea generally.  The solution will lie in the details of the 
reform.  Hence, lawmakers should take note of each objection but treat 
them as challenges to overcome rather than discouragement.  
D.  Scaling Up—Toward Anti-Platform Law? 
The argument of this Article has been limited to one case study, 
namely Facebook Inc.  An unavoidable question arises, however—why 
stop at Facebook?  Why not open up other platforms like Google, 
YouTube, Amazon, Twitter, etc.?  Do we need or even want to live in the 
world in which the vast majority of our interactions are structured 
through platforms? 
Julie Cohen, in her treatise on informational capitalism, observes 
that platforms have become a core organizational unit of socioeconomic 
interaction and that “[e]conomically speaking, platforms represent both 
horizontal and vertical strategies for extracting the surplus value of user 
data.”162  Importantly, however, there is no technical reason to structure 
the internet this way.  It was not so at the beginning, and it does not have 
to be so in the future.163  Again, changing this state of affairs is a question 
of both imagination and political will. 
Consider some examples.  YouTube is a platform hosting videos, 
allowing you to search for, stream, and comment on them; it also 
moderates the content it hosts.  There is no reason why, however, one 
 
 160 See id. at 510–11. 
 161 On the need and tools for accountability, see id. at 516–22. 
 162 COHEN, supra note 9, at 42–44. 
 163 See Mike Masnick, Protocols, Not Platforms: A Technological Approach to Free 
Speech, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM. U. (Aug. 21, 2019), https://knightcolumbia.org/
content/protocols-not-platforms-a-technological-approach-to-free-speech. 
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company must undertake all of these activities.  We could have several 
services for hosting, searching, moderating, and streaming—all 
interoperable with one another.  We could do a similar operation with 
Amazon.  There could be many companies that allow listing offers, 
provide searching abilities, and mediate contracts between buyers, 
sellers, and couriers.  Just as we enacted “antitrust” laws at the end of 
the nineteenth century, taming the excessive growth of the corporate 
form, we could now enact “anti-platform” laws aimed at combating the 
excesses of consolidation of the technological form.  
Of course, to provide an argument for such a sweeping 
intervention, we need to conduct a thorough empirical and conceptual 
study.  Given the political climate and renewed interest in questions of 
interoperability, I expect we will see quite some work devoted to these 
problems.  Importantly, this work should be done both top-down (from 
the concept of interoperability to particular case studies) and bottom-
up (from the case studies to the general conclusions).  This Article is just 
one iteration of the latter strand.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that the “world of fifty facebooks” is 
technically possible, legally achievable, and normatively desirable.  I 
have demonstrated how Facebook Inc.’s current conduct harms 
competition, and how its business model imposes on consumers 
cognitive harms, behavioral harms, and privacy-security harms while 
free riding on their labor and creative content.  I have shown how a 
facebook has become a new type of universal mode of communication 
and how the business model Facebook Inc. employs could be different, 
as it is completely contingent upon the company’s business decisions, 
not related to the underlying technology.  The “price” we pay could be 
lower, and quality of service higher, if only Facebook Inc. was obliged to 
open up its platform and its network to other competitors.  The law 
should oblige it to do that. 
As the debates about regulation of big tech—including social media 
and Facebook Inc.—continue on both sides of the Atlantic, we should 
remember that, as a society, we face a choice.  We might either accept 
the central role that platforms like Facebook play in our socioeconomic 
lives and focus solely on taming the most abusive behaviors they engage 
in, or we might realize that there is nothing natural or necessary about 
this position and concentrate on restructuring the online power 
relationships.  Doing so requires imagination and political will.  This 
Article aims at fostering both.  
 
